Advancements in artificial intelligence and (social) robotics raise pertinent questions as to how these technologies may help shape the society of the future. The main aim of the chapter is to consider the social and conceptual disruptions that might be associated with social robots, and humanoid social robots in particular. This chapter starts by comparing the concepts of robots and artificial intelligence and briefly explores the origins of these expressions. It then explains the definition of a social robot, as well (...) as the definition of humanoid robots. A key notion in this context is the idea of anthropomorphism: the human tendency to attribute human qualities, not only to our fellow human beings, but also to parts of nature and to technologies. This tendency to anthropomorphize technologies by responding to and interacting with them as if they have human qualities is one of the reasons why social robots (in particular social robots designed to look and behave like human beings) can be socially disruptive. As is explained in the chapter, while some ethics researchers believe that anthropomorphization is a mistake that can lead to various forms of deception, others — including both ethics researchers and social roboticists — believe it can be useful or fitting to treat robots in anthropomorphizing ways. The chapter explores that disagreement by, among other things, considering recent philosophical debates about whether social robots can be moral patients, that is, whether it can make sense to treat them with moral consideration. Where one stands on this issue will depend either on one’s views about whether social robots can have, imitate, or represent morally relevant properties, or on how people relate to social robots in their interactions with them. Lastly, the chapter urges that the ethics of social robots should explore intercultural perspectives, and highlights some recent research on Ubuntu ethics and social robots. (shrink)

Layunin ng pag-aaral na mailahad at matukoy ang kahalagahan ng sikolohiya, implikasyon, at mga danas at lakbayin ng “Sunod” sa pangkat ng Biga at mga karatig tribo nito sa Tabuk City, Kalinga. Ang nasabing pananaliksik ay sumailalim sa Kuwalitatibo at Deskriptibong pag-aaral na nilapatan ng Sikolohiyang pagdulog, Sosyolohiya, at Etnograpiya, tinalakay ang mga kulturang kinagisnan ng isang pangkat. Mga piling “Pangat” o pinuno at matatanda sa pangkat Biga ang mga kalahok sa pananaliksik na nagbigay ng kani-kanilang mga karunungan, karanasan at (...) lakbayin sa pagdalumat ng “Sunod” sa buhay. Ang resulta ng pag-aaral sa mga Ibiga at mga karatig tribo ay may maayos na ugnayan at mapayapang pamumuhay. Malakas ang tungkulin ng pamilya sa pagbibigay ng disiplina at pagtutulungan sa bawat miyebro. Lumitaw rin na hindi kailangang magkadugo ang maituturing na “sunod” kundi lahat ng katribo at mga karatig tribo. Dahil dito ay naiiwasan ang mga di-kanais- nais na kaganapan o mga kaguluhan sa pagitan ng bawat isa. Matatag na kanilang sinusunod ang kahalagahan ng relasyong “sunod” sa bawat araw ng kanilang pakikibaka sa buhay. Napatunayan din na malakas ang kapangyarihan ng mg “Pangat” o “Tribal elders” at ibang matatanda sa pagpapanatili ng kaayusan. (shrink)

To escape from the labyrinth of the continuum, Leibniz maintains, we must think very differently about the nature of space, time, bodies, and substances; and in particular we must posit an infinity of simple substances or monads. The main aim of this historically rich and interpretively provocative book is to explain why Leibniz says such things by examining his purported solution and how he arrived at it. Each of the book’s seven chapters focuses on a different “Ariadnean thread” that supposedly (...) helped Leibniz find his way out of the labyrinth. They concern the themes of “composition, aggregation, atoms, forms, motion, substance, and continuation in existence” (6). (shrink)

D’après Heidegger, chaque époque/épochè est caractérisé par un certain mode de révélation des étants, qui est à la fois une dissimulation d’une façon de l’Être. Ce mode particulier paraît ne venir de nulle part en ce qu’il se base sur un certain oubli. Dana S. Belu le met en scène pour son livre en faisant valoir la tendance de Heidegger « to treat the history of being (Seinsgeschichte) as a noncausal succession of universal principles of intelligibility that presupposes the (...) forgetting (Seinsvergessenheit) of the clearing (die Lichtung) as their source » (p. 15). L’oubli de notre époque est marqué par une divulgation technologique dans le mode de l’arraisonnement (Gestell) où les étants se révèlent comme partie du fonds (Bestand) d’être calculés, manipulés, exploités, et mis en réserve pour un usage ultérieur. La phénoménologie féministe de l’A. essaie de faire sens à la gestation, la maternité et la procréation médicalement assistée (PMA) qui font aux femmes faire partie de ce fonds et ouvre, parmi les paramètres du Gestell, la porte à une ère « sans mère ». (shrink)

In the past twenty years, scholarly interest in John Dewey's later writings has surged. While later works such as Art as Experience (1934), Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938), and Freedom and Culture (1939) have received considerable attention, Knowing and the Known (1949), Dewey's late-in-life collaboration with Arthur F. Bentley, has been largely neglected. A common bias among Dewey scholars is that this work, instead of developing Dewey's Logic, departs from its spirit, reflects the overbearing influence of Bentley on (...) Dewey (who was at the time an octogenarian), and, therefore, merits little serious scholarly consideration. However, Dewey and Bentley engaged in an extended correspondence, collected in John Dewey and Arthur Bentley: A Philosophical Correspondence, 1932-1951 (1964), the result of which was no less than a watershed moment in Dewey's thinking on the experimental method of inquiry. The Logic was improved in ways that incorporated the insights of Charles Sanders Peirce's logic and developed Dewey's earlier work in a direction expressly intended by the aging pragmatist. Indeed, Dewey writes in correspondence with his co-author: "You [Bentley] shouldn't lean too heavily on the [1938] Logic; it wasn't a bad job at the time, but I could do better now [with Knowing and the Known]; largely through association with you and getting the courage to see my thing [logical theory] through without compromise" (Correspondence, 4:595, see also 184, 420, 481, 483-84). One of the few scholars of American pragmatism to acknowledge that Knowing and the Known was a watershed development in Dewey's thinking is Frank X. Ryan, author of an exciting new book, Seeing Together: Mind, Matter, and the Experimental Outlook of John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley, that clearly and concisely presents the revolutionary method developed in Knowing and Known: the transactional approach. (shrink)

Arthur Falk has proposed a new construal of faith according to which it is not a mere species of belief, but has essential components in action. This twist on faith promises to resurrect Pascal’s Wager, making faith compatible with reason by believing as the scientist but acting as the theist. I argue that Falk’s proposal leaves religious faith in no better shape; in particular, it merely reframes the question in terms of rational desires rather than rational beliefs.

My first paper on the Is/Ought issue. The young Arthur Prior endorsed the Autonomy of Ethics, in the form of Hume’s No-Ought-From-Is (NOFI) but the later Prior developed a seemingly devastating counter-argument. I defend Prior's earlier logical thesis (albeit in a modified form) against his later self. However it is important to distinguish between three versions of the Autonomy of Ethics: Ontological, Semantic and Ontological. Ontological Autonomy is the thesis that moral judgments, to be true, must answer to a (...) realm of sui generis non-natural PROPERTIES. Semantic autonomy insists on a realm of sui generis non-natural PREDICATES which do not mean the same as any natural counterparts. Logical Autonomy maintains that moral conclusions cannot be derived from non-moral premises.-moral premises with the aid of logic alone. Logical Autonomy does not entail Semantic Autonomy and Semantic Autonomy does not entail Ontological Autonomy. But, given some plausible assumptions Ontological Autonomy entails Semantic Autonomy and given the conservativeness of logic – the idea that in a valid argument you don’t get out what you haven’t put in – Semantic Autonomy entails Logical Autonomy. So if Logical Autonomy is false – as Prior appears to prove – then Semantic and Ontological Autonomy would appear to be false too! I develop a version of Logical Autonomy (or NOFI) and vindicate it against Prior’s counterexamples, which are also counterexamples to the conservativeness of logic as traditionally conceived. The key concept here is an idea derived in part from Quine - that of INFERENCE-RELATIVE VACUITY. I prove that you cannot derive conclusions in which the moral terms appear non-vacuously from premises from which they are absent. But this is because you cannot derive conclusions in which ANY (non-logical) terms appear non-vacuously from premises from which they are absent Thus NOFI or Logical Autonomy comes out as an instance of the conservativeness of logic. This means that the reverse entailment that I have suggested turns out to be a mistake. The falsehood of Logical Autonomy would not entail either the falsehood Semantic Autonomy or the falsehood of Ontological Autonomy, since Semantic Autonomy only entails Logical Autonomy with the aid of the conservativeness of logic of which Logical Autonomy is simply an instance. Thus NOFI or Logical Autonomy is vindicated, but it turns out to be a less world-shattering thesis than some have supposed. It provides no support for either non-cognitivism or non-naturalism. (shrink)

If artworks and their aesthetic properties stand in constitutive relationships to historical context and circumstances, so that some understanding of relevant facts is involved in responding to a work, what becomes of the intuitive view that we see artworks and at least some of their aesthetic properties? This question is raised by arguments in both aesthetics and art history for the historical nature of works of art. The paper argues that the answer needs to take philosophy of perception into account. (...) The principal development that has shaped philosophy of perception in the last thirty years—explaining perceptual experience in terms of contents that represent that such-and-such is the case—is directly relevant to key arguments for the historical nature of art because contents can represent complex kinds and properties. Conceptual realism is especially well-suited for explaining perception of artworks and aesthetic properties because it emphasizes that forms of understanding—in the sense of capacities, abilities and techniques—are involved in perceptual engagement with individual objects and instances of properties. To make this case, the paper examines influential arguments for the historical nature of art and aesthetic properties by Arthur C. Danto and Kendall L. Walton; and examines art-historical discussions by Michael Baxandall, Linda Nochlin and T. J. Clark. The paper argues that the aesthetic properties of an artwork depend on human intentional uses of properties, colours and contours among them, and such uses may themselves be aesthetic. The Wittgensteinian notion of use is contextual and historical, and uses are perceptible. (shrink)

Can new technology enhance purpose-driven, democratic dialogue in groups, governments, and societies? Online Deliberation: Design, Research, and Practice is the first book that attempts to sample the full range of work on online deliberation, forging new connections between academic research, technology designers, and practitioners. Since some of the most exciting innovations have occurred outside of traditional institutions, and those involved have often worked in relative isolation from each other, work in this growing field has often failed to reflect the full (...) set of perspectives on online deliberation. This volume is aimed at those working at the crossroads of information/communication technology and social science, and documents early findings in, and perspectives on, this new field by many of its pioneers. -/- CONTENTS: -/- Introduction: The Blossoming Field of Online Deliberation (Todd Davies, pp. 1-19) -/- Part I - Prospects for Online Civic Engagement -/- Chapter 1: Virtual Public Consultation: Prospects for Internet Deliberative Democracy (James S. Fishkin, pp. 23-35) -/- Chapter 2: Citizens Deliberating Online: Theory and Some Evidence (Vincent Price, pp. 37-58) -/- Chapter 3: Can Online Deliberation Improve Politics? Scientific Foundations for Success (Arthur Lupia, pp. 59-69) -/- Chapter 4: Deliberative Democracy, Online Discussion, and Project PICOLA (Public Informed Citizen Online Assembly) (Robert Cavalier with Miso Kim and Zachary Sam Zaiss, pp. 71-79) -/- Part II - Online Dialogue in the Wild -/- Chapter 5: Friends, Foes, and Fringe: Norms and Structure in Political Discussion Networks (John Kelly, Danyel Fisher, and Marc Smith, pp. 83-93) -/- Chapter 6: Searching the Net for Differences of Opinion (Warren Sack, John Kelly, and Michael Dale, pp. 95-104) -/- Chapter 7: Happy Accidents: Deliberation and Online Exposure to Opposing Views (Azi Lev-On and Bernard Manin, pp. 105-122) -/- Chapter 8: Rethinking Local Conversations on the Web (Sameer Ahuja, Manuel Pérez-Quiñones, and Andrea Kavanaugh, pp. 123-129) -/- Part III - Online Public Consultation -/- Chapter 9: Deliberation in E-Rulemaking? The Problem of Mass Participation (David Schlosberg, Steve Zavestoski, and Stuart Shulman, pp. 133-148) -/- Chapter 10: Turning GOLD into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech Democratic Experimentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy (Peter M. Shane, pp. 149-162) -/- Chapter 11: Baudrillard and the Virtual Cow: Simulation Games and Citizen Participation (Hélène Michel and Dominique Kreziak, pp. 163-166) -/- Chapter 12: Using Web-Based Group Support Systems to Enhance Procedural Fairness in Administrative Decision Making in South Africa (Hossana Twinomurinzi and Jackie Phahlamohlaka, pp. 167-169) -/- Chapter 13: Citizen Participation Is Critical: An Example from Sweden (Tomas Ohlin, pp. 171-173) -/- Part IV - Online Deliberation in Organizations -/- Chapter 14: Online Deliberation in the Government of Canada: Organizing the Back Office (Elisabeth Richard, pp. 177-191) -/- Chapter 15: Political Action and Organization Building: An Internet-Based Engagement Model (Mark Cooper, pp. 193-202) -/- Chapter 16: Wiki Collaboration Within Political Parties: Benefits and Challenges (Kate Raynes-Goldie and David Fono, pp. 203-205) -/- Chapter 17: Debian’s Democracy (Gunnar Ristroph, pp. 207-211) -/- Chapter 18: Software Support for Face-to-Face Parliamentary Procedure (Dana Dahlstrom and Bayle Shanks, pp. 213-220) -/- Part V - Online Facilitation -/- Chapter 19: Deliberation on the Net: Lessons from a Field Experiment (June Woong Rhee and Eun-mee Kim, pp. 223-232) -/- Chapter 20: The Role of the Moderator: Problems and Possibilities for Government-Run Online Discussion Forums (Scott Wright, pp. 233-242) -/- Chapter 21: Silencing the Clatter: Removing Anonymity from a Corporate Online Community (Gilly Leshed, pp. 243-251) -/- Chapter 22: Facilitation and Inclusive Deliberation (Matthias Trénel, pp. 253-257) -/- Chapter 23: Rethinking the ‘Informed’ Participant: Precautions and Recommendations for the Design of Online Deliberation (Kevin S. Ramsey and Matthew W. Wilson, pp. 259-267) -/- Chapter 24: PerlNomic: Rule Making and Enforcement in Digital Shared Spaces (Mark E. Phair and Adam Bliss, pp. 269-271) -/- Part VI - Design of Deliberation Tools -/- Chapter 25: An Online Environment for Democratic Deliberation: Motivations, Principles, and Design (Todd Davies, Brendan O’Connor, Alex Cochran, Jonathan J. Effrat, Andrew Parker, Benjamin Newman, and Aaron Tam, pp. 275-292) -/- Chapter 26: Online Civic Deliberation with E-Liberate (Douglas Schuler, pp. 293-302) -/- Chapter 27: Parliament: A Module for Parliamentary Procedure Software (Bayle Shanks and Dana Dahlstrom, pp. 303-307) -/- Chapter 28: Decision Structure: A New Approach to Three Problems in Deliberation (Raymond J. Pingree, pp. 309-316) -/- Chapter 29: Design Requirements of Argument Mapping Software for Teaching Deliberation (Matthew W. Easterday, Jordan S. Kanarek, and Maralee Harrell, pp. 317-323) -/- Chapter 30: Email-Embedded Voting with eVote/Clerk (Marilyn Davis, pp. 325-327) -/- Epilogue: Understanding Diversity in the Field of Online Deliberation (Seeta Peña Gangadharan, pp. 329-358). -/- For individual chapter downloads, go to odbook.stanford.edu. (shrink)

Nilalayon ng pag-aaral na ito ang isang pagsusuri at/o pagsasalansang tipolohikal ukol sa ilang pelikulang direktang tumuon sa danas at naratibo ng mga manggagawa, mangingibig, at/o manggagawang mangingibig—partikular na ang mga pelikulang idinirehe ni Olivia M. Lamasan. Sa paglago ng anomang larang katulad ng media studies, mahalaga rin ang pagsipat ng tipolohiya at/o pagsasaklasipika batay sa uri ng mga ipinamamayaning paksa. Ito ay upang matukoy ang pinagmumulan at/o pinaghuhugutang idea at inspirasyon ng mga kumatha at higit sa lahat, ang pananalamin (...) sa realidad ng lipunan sa panahon kung kailan ito kinatha. Nakasandig ang panunuring ito hindi lamang sa tradisyonal na pagbubuod ng mga kinathang pelikula, ngunit refleksibo rin uugatin ang kayariang panlipunan nito sa kasalukuyang direksiyon ng edukasyon at nakapangyayaring pagpapahalaga sa mga Pilipinong sining. Ang mga pelikulang Pilipino, lalo pa’t kung malaya at mapagpalaya ay maituturing na isang ekstensiyon at salamin ng mga communal ethos ng sambayanan at kalinangang Pilipino. (shrink)

Integral ang ipinahihiwatig ng mga pelikula sa Pilipinas na direktang nagtampok sa mga kuwentong pag-ibig at paghahanapbuhay ng mga migranteng Pilipino sa ibayong dagat. Patok sa lipunang Pilipino ang mga pelikulang nakakakilig, nakapagbibigay ng ligaya, at inspirasyon. Ngunit hindi din dapat kaligtaan ang isa pang temang maaaring umusbong mula dito—ang kalagayan at danas ng mga karakter, hindi lamang bilang mangingibig, kundi bilang manggagawa din. Kung gayon, pagkalas ito panandalian sa kinasanayang pagtrato sa mga romantic movie ng mga Pilipino sa payak (...) nitong anyo bilang kuwentong pag-ibig lamang. Bagkus, malaong holistikong magsisiwalat sa malawakang diaspora at realidad ng paggawang Pilipino sa iba’t ibang bahagi ng mundo. Layunin ng artikulong ito na muling ipasundayag ang pagtatalaban ng puso na siyang simbolo ng pag-ibig at kamay na kumakatawan o metapora ng paghahanapbuhay. Partikular na susuyurin ang dalawang pelikula na nasa direksiyon ni Olivia Lamasan, na nagtampok sa mga Pilipino sa Estados Unidos—ang Sana Maulit Muli at In My Life. (shrink)

Feminism and Tradition in Aesthetics takes a fresh look at the history of aesthetics and at current debates within the philosophy of art by exploring the ways in which gender informs notions of art and creativity, evaluation and interpretation, and concepts of aesthetic value. Multiple intellectual traditions have formed this field, and the discussions herein range from consideration of eighteenth century legacies of ideas about taste, beauty, and sublimity to debates about the relevance of postmodern analyses for feminist aesthetics. Forward (...) by Arthur C. Danto, 20 authors include Paul Mattick, Jr., Caroline Korsmeyer, Timothy Gould, Christine Battersby, Mary Devereaux, bell hooks, REnee Lorraine, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Elizabeth Ann Dobie, Adrian Piper, Anita Silvers, Susan Feagin, Mary D. Garrard, Ellen Handler Spitz, Noel Carroll, Joanne Waugh, Joseph Margolis, Rita Felski, and Hilde Hein, as well as Peg Brand's essay, "Revising the Aesthetic-Nonaesthetic Distinction: The Aesthetic Value of Activist Art.". (shrink)

continent. 1.1 : 3-13. / 0/ – Introduction I want to propose, as a trajectory into the philosophically weird, an absurd theoretical claim and pursue it, or perhaps more accurately, construct it as I point to it, collecting the ground work behind me like the Perpetual Train from China Mieville's Iron Council which puts down track as it moves reclaiming it along the way. The strange trajectory is the following: Kant's critical philosophy and much of continental philosophy which has followed, (...) has been a defense against horror and madness. Kant's prohibition on speculative metaphysics such as dogmatic metaphysics and transcendental realism, on thinking beyond the imposition of transcendental and moral constraints, has been challenged by numerous figures proceeding him. One of the more interesting critiques of Kant comes from the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land stating, “Kant’s critical philosophy is the most elaborate fit of panic in the history of the Earth.” And while Alain Badiou would certainly be opposed to the libidinal investments of Land's Deleuzo-Guattarian thought, he is likewise critical of Kant's normative thought-bureaucracies: Kant is the one author for whom I cannot feel any kinship. Everything in him exasperates me, above all his legalism—always asking Quid Juris? Or ‘Haven’t you crossed the limit?’—combined, as in today’s United States, with a religiosity that is all the more dismal in that it is both omnipresent and vague. The critical machinery he set up has enduringly poisoned philosophy, while giving great succour to the academy, which loves nothing more than to rap the knuckles of the overambitious [….] That is how I understand the truth of Monique David-Menard’s reflections on the properly psychotic origins of Kantianism. I am persuaded that the whole of the critical enterprise is set up to to shield against the tempting symptom represented by the seer Swedenborg, or against ‘diseases of the head’, as Kant puts it. An entire nexus of the limits of reason and philosophy are set up here, namely that the critical philosophy not only defends thought from madness, philosophy from madness, and philosophy from itself, but that philosophy following the advent of the critical enterprise philosophy becomes auto-vampiric; feeding on itself to support the academy. Following Francois Laruelle's non-philosophical indictment of philosophy, we could go one step further and say that philosophy operates on the material of what is philosophizable and not the material of the external world. [1] Beyond this, the Kantian scheme of nestling human thinking between our limited empirical powers and transcendental guarantees of categorical coherence, forms of thinking which stretch beyond either appear illegitimate, thereby liquefying both pre-critical metaphysics and the ravings of the mad in the same critical acid. In rejecting the Kantian apparatus we are left with two entities – an unsure relation of thought to reality where thought is susceptible to internal and external breakdown and a reality with an uncertain sense of stability. These two strands will be pursued, against the sane-seal of post-Kantian philosophy by engaging the work of weird fiction authors H.P. Lovecraft and Thomas Ligotti. The absolute inhumanism of the formers universe will be used to describe a Shoggothic Materialism while the dream worlds of the latter will articulate the mad speculation of a Ventriloquil Idealism. But first we must address the relation of philosophy to madness as well as philosophy to weird fiction. /1/ – Philosophy and Madness There is nothing that the madness of men invents which is not either nature made manifest or nature restored. Michel Foucault. Madness and Civilization. The moment I doubt whether an event that I recall actually took place, I bring the suspicion of madness upon myself: unless I am uncertain as to whether it was not a mere dream. Arthur Schopenhauer. The World as Will and Idea, Vol. 3. Madness is commonly thought of as moving through several well known cultural-historical shifts from madness as a demonic or otherwise theological force, to rationalization, to medicalization psychiatric and otherwise. Foucault's Madness and Civilization is well known for orientating madness as a form of exclusionary social control which operated by demarcating madness from reason. Yet Foucault points to the possibility of madness as the necessity of nature at least prior to the crushing weight of the church. Kant’s philosophy as a response to madness is grounded by his humanizing of madness itself. As Adrian Johnston points out in the early pages of Time Driven pre-Kantian madness meant humans were seized by demonic or angelic forces whereas Kantian madness became one of being too human. Madness becomes internalized, the external demonic forces become flaws of the individual mind. Foucault argues that, while madness is de-demonized it is also dehumanized during the Renaissance, as madmen become creatures neither diabolic nor totally human reduced to the zero degree of humanity. It is immediately clear why for Kant, speculative metaphysics must be curbed – with the problem of internal madness and without the external safeguards of transcendental conditions, there is nothing to formally separate the speculative capacities for metaphysical diagnosis from the mad ramblings of the insane mind – both equally fall outside the realm of practicality and quotidian experience. David-Menard's work is particularly useful in diagnosing the relation of thought and madness in Kant's texts. David-Menard argues that in Kant's relatively unknown “An Essay on the Maladies of the Mind” as well as his later discussion of the Seer of Swedenborg, that Kant formulates madness primarily in terms of sensory upheaval or other hallucinatory theaters. She writes: “madness is an organization of thought. It is made possible by the ambiguity of the normal relation between the imaginary and the perceived, whether this pertains to the order of sensation or to the relations between our ideas” Kant's fascination with the Seer forces Kant between the pincers of “aesthetic reconciliation” – namely melancholic withdrawal – and “a philosophical invention” – namely the critical project. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis is a combination and reversal of Kant's split, where an aesthetic over engagement with the world entails prolific conceptual invention. Their embrace of madness, however, is of course itself conceptual despite all their rhizomatic maneuvers. Though they move with the energy of madness, Deleuze and Guattari save the capacity of thought from the fangs of insanity by imbuing materiality itself with the capacity for thought. Or, as Ray Brassier puts it, “Deleuze insists, it is necessary to absolutize the immanence of this world in such a way as to dissolve the transcendent disjunction between things as we know them and as they are in themselves”. That is, whereas Kant relied on the faculty of judgment to divide representation from objectivity Deleuze attempts to flatten the whole economy beneath the juggernaut of ontological univocity. Speculation, as a particularly useful form of madness, might fall close to Deleuze and Guattari’s shaping of philosophy into a concept producing machine but is different in that it is potentially self destructive – less reliant on the stability of its own concepts and more adherent to exposing a particular horrifying swath of reality. Speculative madness is always a potential disaster in that it acknowledges little more than its own speculative power with the hope that the gibbering of at least a handful of hysterical brains will be useful. Pre-critical metaphysics amounts to madness, though this may be because the world itself is mad while new attempts at speculative metaphysics, at post-Kantian pre-critical metaphysics, are well aware of our own madness. Without the sobriety of the principle of sufficient reason we have a world of neon madness: “we would have to conceive what our life would be if all the movements of the earth, all the noises of the earth, all the smells, the tastes, all the light – of the earth and elsewhere, came to us in a moment, in an instant – like an atrocious screaming tumult of things”. Speculative thought may be participatory in the screaming tumult of the world or, worse yet, may produce its spectral double. Against theology or reason or simply commonsense, the speculative becomes heretical. Speculation, as the cognitive extension of the horrorific sublime should be met with melancholic detachment. Whereas Kant's theoretical invention, or productivity of thought, is self -sabotaging, since the advent of the critical project is a productivity of thought which then delimits the engine of thought at large either in dogmatic gestures or non-systematizable empirical wondrousness. The former is celebrated by the fiction of Thomas Ligotti whereas the latter is espoused by the tales of H.P. Lovecraft. /2/ – Weird Fiction and Philosophy. Supernatural horror, in all its eerie constructions, enables a reader to taste treats inconsistent with his personal welfare. Thomas Ligotti Songs of a Dead Dreamer. I choose weird stories because they suit my inclination best—one of my strongest and most persistent wishes being to achieve,momentarily, the illusion of some strange suspension or violation of the galling limitations of time, space, and natural law which forever imprison us and frustrate our curiosity about the infinite cosmic spaces beyond the radius of our sight and analysis H.P. Lovecraft. “Notes on Writing Weird Fiction” Lovecraft states that his creation of a story is to suspend natural law yet, at the same time, he indexes the tenuousness of such laws, suggesting the vast possibilities of the cosmic. The tension that Lovecraft sets up between his own fictions and the universe or nature is reproduced within his fictions in the common theme of the unreliable narrator; unreliable precisely because they are either mad or what they have witnessed questions the bounds of material reality. In “The Call of Cthulhu” Lovecraft writes: The most merciful thing in the world, I think, is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents. We live on a placid island of ignorance in the midst of black seas of infinity, and it was not meant that we should voyage far. The sciences, each straining in its own direction, have hitherto harmed us little; but some day the piecing together of dissociated knowledge will open up such terrifying vistas of reality, and of our frightful position therein, that we shall either go mad from the revelation or flee from the deadly light into the peace and safety of a new dark age. Despite Lovecraft's invocations of illusion, he is not claiming that his fantastic creations such as the Old Ones are supernatural but, following Joshi, are only ever supernormal. One can immediately see that instead of nullifying realism Lovecraft in fact opens up the real to an unbearable degree. In various letters and non-fictional statements Lovecraft espoused strictly materialist tenets, ones which he borrowed from Hugh Elliot namely the uniformity of law, the denial of teleology and the denial of non-material existence. Lovecraft seeks to explore the possibilities of such a universe by piling horror upon horror until the fragile brain which attempts to grasp it fractures. This may be why philosophy has largely ignored weird fiction – while Deleuze and Guattari mark the turn towards weird fiction and Lovecraft in particular, with the precursors to speculative realism as well as contemporary related thinkers have begun to view Lovecraft as making philosophical contributions. Lovecraft's own relation to philosophy is largely critical while celebrating Nietzsche and Schopenhauer. This relationship of Lovecraft to philosophy and philosophy to Lovecraft is coupled with Lovecraft's habit of mercilessly destroying the philosopher and the figure of the academic more generally in his work, a destruction which is both an epistemological destruction and an ontological destruction. Thomas Ligotti's weird fiction which he has designated as a kind of “confrontational escapism” might be best described in the following quote from one of his shortstories, “The human phenomenon is but the sum of densely coiled layers of illusion each of which winds itself on the supreme insanity. That there are persons of any kind when all there can be is mindless mirrors laughing and screaming as they parade about in an endless dream”. Whereas Lovecraft's weirdness draws predominantly from the abyssal depths of the uncharted universe, Ligotti's existential horror focuses on the awful proliferation of meaningless surfaces that is, the banal and every day function of representation. In an interview, Ligotti states: We don't even know what the world is like except through our sense organs, which are provably inadequate. It's no less the case with our brains. Our whole lives are motored along by forces we cannot know and perceptions that are faulty. We sometimes hear people say that they're not feeling themselves. Well, who or what do they feel like then? This is not to say that Ligotti sees nothing beneath the surface but that there is only darkness or blackness behind it, whether that surface is on the cosmological level or the personal. By addressing the implicit and explicit philosophical issues in Ligotti's work we will see that his nightmarish take on reality is a form of malevolent idealism, an idealism which is grounded in a real, albeit dark and obscure materiality. If Ligotti's horrors ultimately circle around mad perceptions which degrade the subject, it takes aim at the vast majority of the focus of continental philosophy. While Lovecraft's acidic materialism clearly assaults any romantic concept of being from the outside, Ligotti attacks consciousness from the inside: Just a little doubt slipped into the mind, a little trickle of suspicion in the bloodstream, and all those eyes of ours, one by one, open up to the world and see its horror [...] Not even the solar brilliance of a summer day will harbor you from horror. For horror eats the light and digests it into darkness. Clearly, the weird fiction of Lovecraft and Ligotti amount to a anti-anthrocentric onslaught against the ramparts of correlationist continental philosophy. /3/ – Shoggothic Materialism or the Formless Formless protoplasm able to mock and reflect all forms and organs and processes—viscous agglutinations of bubbling cells—rubbery fifteen-foot spheroids infinitely plastic and ductile—slaves of suggestion, builders of cities—more and more sullen, more and more intelligent, more and more amphibious, more and more imitative—Great God! What madness made even those blasphemous Old Ones willing to use and to carve such things? H.P. Lovecraft. “At the Mountains of Madness” On the other hand, affirming that the universe resembles nothing and is only formless amounts to saying that the universe is something like a spider or spit. Georges Bataille. “Formless”. The Shoggoths feature most prominently in H.P. Lovecraft's shortstory “At the Mountains of Madness” where they are described in the following manner: It was a terrible, indescribable thing vaster than any subway train – a shapeless congeries of protoplasmic bubbles, faintly self -luminous, and with myriads of temporary eyes forming and un-forming as pustules of greenish light all over the tunnel-filling front that bore down upon us, crushing the frantic penguins and slithering over the glistening floor that it and its kind had swept so evilly free of all litter. The term is a litmus test for materialism itself as the Shoggoth is an amorphous creature. The Shoggoths were living digging machines bio engineered by the Elder Things, and their protoplasmic bodies being formed into various tools by their hypnotic powers. The Shoggoths eventually became self aware and rose up against their masters in an ultimately failed rebellion. After the Elder Ones retreated into the oceans leaving the Shoggoths to roam the frozen wastes of the Antarctic. The onto-genesis of the Shoggoths and their gross materiality, index the horrifyingly deep time of the earth a concept near and dear to Lovecraft's formulation of horror as well as the fear of intelligences far beyond, and far before, the ascent of humankind on earth and elsewhere. The sickly amorphous nature of the Shoggoths invade materialism at large, where while materiality is unmistakably real ie not discursive, psychological, or otherwise overly subjectivist, it questions the relation of materialism to life. As Eugene Thacker writes: The Shoggoths or Elder Things do not even share the same reality with the human beings who encounter them—and yet this encounter takes place, though in a strange no-place that is neither quite that of the phenomenal world of the human subject or the noumenal world of an external reality. Amorphous yet definitively material beings are a constant in Lovecraft's tales. In his tale “The Dream-Quest of Unknown Kadatth” Lovecraft describes Azathoth as, “that shocking final peril which gibbers unmentionably outside the ordered universe,” that, “last amorphous blight of nethermost confusion which blashphemes and bubbles at the centre of all infinity,” who, “gnaws hungrily in inconceivable, unlighted chambers beyond time”. Azathoth's name may have multiple origins but the most striking is the alchemy term azoth which is both a cohesive agent and a acidic creation pointing back to the generative and the decayed. The indistinction of generation and degradation materially mirrors the blur between the natural and the unnatural as well as life and non-life. Lovecraft speaks of the tension between the natural and the unnatural is his short story “The Unnameable.” He writes, “if the psychic emanations of human creatures be grotesque distortions, what coherent representation could express or portray so gibbous and infamous a nebulousity as the spectre of a malign, chaotic perversion, itself a morbid blasphemy against Nature?”. Lovecraft explores exactly the tension outlined at the beginning of this chapter, between life and thought. At the end of his short tale Lovecraft compounds the problem as the unnameable is described as “a gelatin—a slime—yet it had shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory”. Deleuze suggests that becoming-animal is operative throughout Lovecraft's work, where narrators feel themselves reeling at their becoming non-human or of being the anomalous or of becoming atomized. Following Eugene Thacker however, it may be far more accurate to say that Lovecraft's tales exhibit not a becoming-animal but a becoming-creature. Where the monstrous breaks the purportedly fixed laws of nature, the creature is far more ontologically ambiguous. The nameless thing is an altogether different horizon for thought. The creature is either less than animal or more than animal – its becoming is too strange for animal categories and indexes the slow march of thought towards the bizarre. This strangeness is, as aways, some indefinite swirling in the category of immanence and becoming. Bataille begins “The Labyrinth” with the assertion that being, to continue to be, is becoming. More becoming means more being hence the assertion that Bataille's barking dog is more than the sponge. This would mean that the Shoggotth is altogether too much being, too much material in the materialism. Bataille suggests that there is an immanence between the eater and the eaten, across the species and never within them. That is, despite the chaotic storm of immanence there must remain some capacity to distinguish the gradients of becoming without reliance upon, or at least total dependence upon, the powers of intellection to parse the universe into recognizable bits, properly digestible factoids. That is, if we undo Deleuze's aforementioned valorization of sense which, for his variation of materialism, performed the work of the transcendental, but refuse to reinstate Kant's transcendental disjunction between thing and appearance, then it must be a quality of becoming-as-being itself which can account for the discernible nature of things by sense. In an interview with Peter Gratton, Jane Bennett formulates the problem thusly: What is this strange systematicity proper to a world of Becoming? What, for example, initiates this congealing that will undo itself? Is it possible to identify phases within this formativity, plateaus of differentiation? If so, do the phases/plateaus follow a temporal sequence? Or, does the process of formation inside Becoming require us to theorize a non-chronological kind of time? I think that your student’s question: “How can we account for something like iterable structures in an assemblage theory?” is exactly the right question. Philosophy has erred too far on the side of the subject in the subject-object relation and has furthermore, lost the very weirdness of the non-human. Beyond this, the madness of thought need not override. /4/ - Ventriloquial Idealism or the Externality of Thought My aim is the opposite of Lovecraft's. He had an appreciation for natural scenery on earth and wanted to reach beyond the visible in the universe. I have no appreciation for natural scenery and want the objective universe to be a reflection of a character. Thomas Ligotti. “Devotees of Decay and Desolation.” Unless life is a dream, nothing makes sense. For as a reality, it is a rank failure [….] Horror is more real than we are. Thomas Ligotti. “Professor Nobody's Little Lectures on Supernatural Horror”. Thomas Ligotti's tales are rife with mannequins, puppets, and other brainless entities which of replace the valorized subject of philosophy – that of the free thinking human being. His tales such as “The Dream of the Manikin” aim to destroy the rootedness of consciousness. James Trafford has connected the anti-egoism of Ligotti to Thomas Metzinger – where the self is at best an illusion and we plead desperately for someone else to acknowledge that we are real. Trafford has stated it thus, “Life is played out as an inescapable puppet show, an endless dream in which the puppets are generally unaware that they are trapped within a mesmeric dance of whose mechanisms they know nothing and over which they have no control”. An absolute materialism, for Ligotti, implies an alienation of the idea which leads to a ventriloquil idealism. As Ligotti notes in an interview, “the fiasco and nightmare of existence, the particular fiasco and nightmare of human existence, the sense that people are puppets of powers they cannot comprehend, etc.” And then further elaborates that,“[a]ssuming that anything has to exist, my perfect world would be one in which everyone has experienced the annulment of his or her ego. That is, our consciousness of ourselves as unique individuals would entirely disappear”. The externality of the idea leads to the unfortunate consequence of consciousness eating at itself through horror which, for Ligotti, is more real than reality and goes beyond horror-as-affect. Beyond this, taking together with the unreality of life and the ventriloquizing of subjectivity, Ligotti's thought becomes an idealism in which thought itself is alien and ultimately horrifying. The role of human thought and the relation of non-relation of horror to thought is not completely clear in Ligotti's The Conspiracy Against the Human Race. Ligotti argues in his The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,that the advent of thought is a mistake of nature and that horror is being in the sense that horror results from knowing too much. Yet, at the same time, Ligotti seems to suggest that thought separates us from nature whereas, for Lovecraft, thought is far less privileged – mind is just another manifestation of the vital principal, it is just another materialization of energy. In his brilliant “Prospects for Post-Copernican Dogmatism” Iain Grant rallies against the negative definition of dogmatism and the transcendental, and suggests that negatively defining both over-focuses on conditions of access and subjectivism at the expense of the real or nature. With Schelling, who is Grant's champion against the subjectivist bastions of both Fichte and Kant, Ligotti's idealism could be taken as a transcendental realism following from an ontological realism. Yet the transcendental status of Ligotti's thought move towards a treatment of the transcendental which may threaten to leave beyond its realist ground. Ligotti states: Belief in the supernatural is only superstition. That said, a sense of the supernatural, as Conrad evidenced in Heart of Darkness, must be admitted if one's inclination is to go to the limits of horror. It is the sense of what should not be- the sense of being ravaged by the impossible. Phenomenally speaking, the super-natural may be regarded as the metaphysical counterpart of insanity, a transcendental correlative of a mind that has been driven mad. Again, Ligotti equates madness with thought, qualifying both as supernatural while remaining less emphatic about the metaphysical dimensions of horror. The question becomes one of how exactly the hallucinatory realm of the ideal relates to the black churning matter of Lovecraft's chaos of elementary particles. In his tale “I Have a Special Plan for This World” Ligotti formulates thus: A: There is no grand scheme of things. B: If there were a grand scheme of things, the fact – the fact – that we are not equipped to perceive it, either by natural or supernatural means, is a nightmarish obscenity. C: The very notion of a grand scheme of things is a nightmarish obscenity. Here Ligotti is not discounting metaphysics but implying that if it does exist the fact that we are phenomenologically ill-equipped to perceive that it is nightmarish. For Ligotti, nightmare and horror occur within the circuit of consciousness whereas for Lovecraft the relation between reality and mind is less productive on the side of mind. It is easier to ascertain how the Kantian philosophy is a defense against the diseases of the head as Kant armors his critical enterprise from too much of the world and too much of the mind. The weird fiction of both Lovecraft and Ligotti demonstrates that there is too much of both feeding into one another in a way that corrodes the Kantian schema throughly, breaking it down into a dead but still ontologically potentiated nigredo. The haunting, terrifying fact of Ligotti's idealism is that the transcendental motion which brought thought to matter, while throughly material and naturalized, brings with it the horror that thought cannot be undone without ending the material that bears it either locally or completely. Thought comes from an elsewhere and an elsewhen being-in-thought. The unthinkable outside thought is as maddening as the unthought engine of thought itself within thought which doesn't exist except for the mind, the rotting décor of the brain. /5/ - Hyperstitional Transcendental Paranoia or Self -Expelled Thought Weird fiction has been given some direct treatment in philosophy in the mad black Deleuzianism of Nick Land. Nick Land along with others in the 1990s created the Cyber Culture Research Unit as well as the research group Hyperstition. The now defunct hyperstitional website, an outgrowth of the Cyber Culture Research Unit, defined hyperstition in the following fourfold: 1-Element of effective culture that makes itself real. 2-Fictional quantity functional as a time-traveling device. 3-Coincidence intensifier. 4-Call to the Old Ones. The distinctively Lovecraftian character of hyperstition is hard to miss as is its Deleuzo-Guattarian roots. In the opening pages of A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari write, “We have been criticized for over-quoting literary authors. But when one writes, the only question is which other machine the literary machine can be plugged into”. The indisinction of literature and philosophy mirrors the mess of being and knowing as post-correlationist philosophy, where philosophy tries to make itself real where literature, especially the weird, aims itself at the brain-circuit of horror. The texts of both Lovecraft and Ligotti work through horror as epistemological plasticity meeting with proximity as well as the deep time of Lovecraft and the glacially slow time of paranoia in Ligotti. Against Deleuze, and following Brassier, we cannot allow the time of consciousness, the Bergsonian time of the duree, to override natural time, but instead acknowledge that it is an unfortunate fact of existence as a thinking being. Horror-time, the time of consciousness, with all its punctuated moments and drawn out terrors, cannot compare to the deep time of non-existence both in the unreachable past and the unknown future. The crystalline cogs of Kant's account of experience as the leading light for the possibility of metaphysics must be throughly obliterated. His gloss of experience in Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics could not be more sterile: Experience consists of intuitions, which belong to the sensibility, and of judgments, which are entirely a work of the understanding. But the judgments which the understanding makes entirely out of sensuous intuitions are far from being judgments of experience. For in the one case the judgment connects only the perceptions as they are given in sensuous intuition [....] Experience consists in the synthetic connection of appearances in consciousness, so far as this connection is necessary. Here it is difficult to dismiss the queasiness that Kant's legalism induces upon sight for both Badiou and David-Menard. Kant's thought becomes, as Foucault says when reflecting on Sade's text in relation to nature, “the savage abolition of itself”. For Badiou, Kant's philosophy simply closes off too much of the outside, freezing the world of thought in an all too limited formalism. Critical philosophy is simply the systematized quarantine on future thinking, on thinking which would threaten the formalism which artificially grants thought its own coherency in the face of madness. Even the becoming-mad of Deleuze, while escaping the rumbling ground, makes grounds for itself, mad grounds but grounds which are thinkable in their affect. The field of effects allows for Deleuze's aesthetic and radical empiricism, in which effects and/or occasions make up the material of the world to be thought as a chaosmosis of simulacra. Given a critique of an empiricism of aesthetics, of the image, it may be difficult to justify an attack on Kantian formalism with the madness of literature, which does not aim to make itself real but which we may attempt to make real. That is, how do Lovecraft's and Ligotti's materials, as materials for philosophy to work on, differ from either the operative formalisms of Kant or the implicitly formalized images of Deleuzian empiricism? It is simply that such texts do not aim to make themselves real, and make claims to the real which are more alien to us than familiar, which is why their horror is immediately more trustworthy. This is the madness which Blanchot discusses in The Infinite Conversation through Cervantes and his knight – the madness of book-life, of the perverse unity of literature and life a discussion which culminates in the discussion of one of the weird's masters, that of Kafka. The text is the knowing of madness, since madness, in its moment of becoming-more-mad, cannot be frozen in place but by the solidifications of externalizing production. This is why Foucault ends his famous study with works of art. Furthermore extilligence, the ability to export the products of our maligned brains, is the companion of the attempts to export, or discover the possibility of intelligences outside of our heads, in order for philosophy to survive the solar catastrophe. To borrow again from Deleuze, writing is inseparable from becoming. The mistake is to believe that madness is reabsorbed by extilligence, by great works, or that it could be exorcised by the expelling of thought into the inorganic or differently organic. Going out of our heads does not guarantee we will no longer mean we cannot still go out of our minds. This is simply because of the outside, of matter, or force, or energy, or thing-in-itself, or Schopenhauerian Will. In Lovecraft’s “The Music of Erich Zahn” an “impoverished student of metaphysics” becomes intrigued by strange viol music coming from above his room. After meeting the musician the student discovers that each night he plays frantic music at a window in order to keep some horridness at bay, some “impenetrable darkness with chaos and pandemonium”. The aesthetic defenses provided by the well trained brain can bear the hex of matter for so long, the specter of unalterability within it which too many minds obliterate, collapsing everything before the thought of thought as thinkable or at least noetically mutable on our own terms. Transcendental paranoia is the concurrent nightmare and promise of Paul Humphrey's work, of being literally out of our minds. It is the gothic counterpart of thinking non-conceptually but also of thinking never belonging to any instance of purportedly solid being. As Bataille stated, “At the boundary of that which escapes cohesion, he who reflects within cohesion realizes there is no longer any room for him” Thought is immaterial only to the degree that it is inhuman, it is a power that tries, always with failure, to ascertain its own genesis. Philosophy, if it can truly return to the great outdoors, if it can leave behind the dead loop of the human skull, must recognize not only the non-priority of human thought, but that thought never belongs to the brain that thinks it, thought comes from somewhere else. To return to the train image from the beginning “a locomotive rolling on the surface of the earth is the image of continuous metamorphosis” this is the problem of thought, and of thinking thought, of being no longer able to isolate thought, with only a thought-formed structure. [1] One of the central tenets of Francois Laruelle's non-philosophy is that philosophy has traditionally operated on material already presupposed as thinkable instead of trying to think the real in itself. Philosophy, according to Laruelle, remains fixated on transcendental synthesis which shatters immanence into an empirical datum and an a prori factum which are then fused by a third thing such as the ego. For a critical account of Laruelle's non-philosophy see Ray Brassier's Nihil Unbound. (shrink)

DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco Embrapa Semiárido -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- Os estudantes de Veterinária e de Zootecnia estão ligados à disciplina Reprodução Animal, um pelos mecanismos fisiológicos para evitar e tratar as possíveis patologias do trato reprodutivo dos animais domésticos, e outro para o entendimento dos processos fisiológicos visando o manejo reprodutivo e a procriação para a formação de um plantel geneticamente melhorado. Sendo assim, a finalidade do presente trabalho é apresentar os (...) mecanismos que regulam as diferenças sobre o desenvolvimento embrionário relativos à diferenciação e determinação sexual de machos e fêmeas, que também incluem o desenvolvimento dos órgãos envolvidos na reprodução e a origem das diferenças entre ambos os sexos. -/- •____INTRODUÇÃO -/- Os organismos que se reproduzem sexualmente são descendentes de organismos ao qual não existia a diferenciação sexual. Em algum momento da evolução surgiu a reprodução sexual como um mecanismo para incrementar a diversidade genética e facilitar a troca de informações genéticas mediante o material genético da fêmea com o do macho. Devido sua origem comum, na maioria das espécies, tanto os machos como as fêmeas possuem todos os genes necessários para desenvolverem-se em qualquer dos sexos. O que efetivamente faz diferença entre os sexos é a forma e a ordem ao qual se expressam os genes durante o processo de desenvolvimento. A diferenciação sexual é regulada principalmente por mecanismos epigenéticos, mais do que as diferenças genéticas de grande magnitude entre os sexos. Todo o controle epigenético de qualquer processo de desenvolvimento depende basicamente de uma série de expressões gênicas, através da qual a expressão de certa combinação de genes resulta na presença de determinadas proteínas, conhecidas como os fatores de transcrição, que induzem ou reprimem a expressão de outro(os) gene(es), a partir dos quais se produzem novas proteínas, que em certos casos também atuam como fatores de transcrição para outros genes, e assim sucessivamente. Logo, a expressão ou falta de expressão de um gene ao início da série pode resultar em um ladrão totalmente diferente da expressão de outros genes subsequentes, o que pode ocasionar profundas mudanças no processo de desenvolvimento e até a mutações indesejáveis. O padrão predeterminado de expressões gênica relativo a diferenciação sexual na maioria das espécies tanto domésticas quanto selvagens, leva ao desenvolvimento de um dos sexos (o padrão predeterminado dos mamíferos é o sexo feminino). Em consequência, a diferenciação faz com que um indivíduo do sexo oposto exija a expressão de um gene de determinação sexual que desvie a subsequente série de expressões gênica em direção ao dito sexo. Nos mamíferos, a expressão do gene SRY, localizado no cromossomo Y (e portanto ausente nas fêmeas), redige o padrão de diferenciação sexual de sua via pré-estabelecida feminina em direção ao padrão masculino. A existência de uma única diferença genética (presença do gene SRY nos machos e ausentes nas fêmeas), vai se amplificando e termina resultando no desenvolvimento de indivíduos diferentes entre si. Esse é um mecanismo de diferenciação sexual cromossômica. O primeiro passo de uma série de diferenciação sexual, em sentido estrito, não depende nem requer necessariamente a presença de um gene diferente em algum dos sexos. O gene “disparador” da diferenciação sexual pode estar presente em todos os embriões, porém pode expressar-se somente em algum deles, devido a fatores ambientais que formam parte da sua regulação epigenética, isto é, uma determinação sexual ambiental. Em algumas espécies de tartarugas ou de lagartos a expressão ou falta de expressão do gene “disparador”, por exemplo, depende da temperatura existente durante a incubação dos ovos, pelo qual alguns embriões desenvolvem-se como machos e outros como fêmeas, apesar de não existir diferença genética entre eles, simplesmente como consequência da temperatura: a determinação sexual depende da temperatura a que cada um deles foi submetido durante a incubação. Em certas espécies as temperaturas mais elevadas facilitam o desenvolvimento de fêmeas e outras de machos, enquanto que em outras espécies as temperaturas amenas (intermediárias) resultam em machos, e as inferiores como as superiores induzem o desenvolvimento de fêmeas. A existência dessa diversidade indica que a temperatura por si mesma não é a que induz ou a que provoca o desenvolvimento do macho e da fêmea, senão a que atua somente como um regulador inicial da diferenciação sexual. Em outras espécies o fator ambiental que regula a determinação sexual pode ser distinto. A densidade populacional, por exemplo, pode atuar como um regulador. Podemos concluir que a determinação sexual dependente da temperatura ou de outros fatores ambientais estabelece-se antes da determinação sexual cromossômica, a qual evoluiu depois como um método que oferece maior certeza e resultado, já que a proporção de machos e fêmeas não é afetada por mudanças ambientais ou de hábitat. -/- •___FORMAÇÃO INICIAL DA GÔNADA -/- Basicamente em todos os embriões, inicialmente se formam as chamadas gônadas indiferenciadas (com o potencial de desenvolver-se em ovários ou testículos) a partir da invasão das cristas genitais pelas células germinais primordiais, que migram desde seu local de origem no epiblasto, perto do lugar onde o saco vitelino se une com o intestino primitivo e que chegam até às cristas genitais que são engrossamentos de tecido situados na região mesonéfrica do embrião. A migração das células germinais primordiais ocorre muito cedo sobre o processo de desenvolvimento do embrião (dia 26 nos bovinos). Ao chegas as cristas genitais, as células germinativas proliferam-se e se organizam com as células somáticas já existentes nas cristas para ir formando a gônada (figura 1). Para regular essa remodelação e conformação adequada da gônada vários genes se expressam, como o OCT-4 (que aparentemente mantém a totipotencialidade da gônada), assim como o SF-1 (Fator esteroidogênico 1) e o WT-1 (gene associado ao tumor de Wilms). Esses dois últimos genes estimulam a proliferação celular e estabelecimento dos cordões sexuais. Nessa etapa inicial do desenvolvimento todos esses genes se expressam sem distinção de sexo, pelo que a gônada em formação mantém a capacidade de se diferenciar em testículo ou em ovário. -/- Figura 1: migração das células germinais primordiais em direção a crista gonodal. Diferenciação das gônadas femininas e masculinas. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- •___SEXO CROMOSSÔMICO -/- Têm-se observado que nos mamíferos a determinação sexual depende diretamente dos cromossomos. As fêmeas possuem dois cromossomos sexuais X (um contribuído do óvulo e o outro por um espermatozoide “X”). Os machos, por sua vez, possuem um cromossomo sexual X(proveniente do óvulo) e um cromossomo sexual Y, que provém de um espermatozoide “Y” (figura 2). A metade dos espermatozoides produzidos por um macho são X e a metade Y, isso porque durante a espermatogênese a divisão meiótica provoca que a partir de cada espermatócito primário, célula diploide que por pertencer a um indivíduo macho tem um cromossomo X e um Y, se originem das espermátides haploides a cada um das que eles tocam cromossomos X, e outras espermátides haploides as que eles tocam os cromossomos Y. Dessa forma, de acordo com o tipo do espermatozoide que fertilize o ovócito, se originará um indivíduo com cariótipo feminino “XX” ou um cariótipo masculino “XY” (figura 2). Esse processo é conhecido como sexo cromossômico, ao qual se determina o momento da fertilização. Figura 2: nos mamíferos todos os óvulos produzidos pelas fêmeas possuem um cromossomo sexual X. A metade dos espermatozoides produzidos pelos machos possuem um cromossomo X e a outra metade possui um cromossomo Y. Dependendo do cromossomo presente no espermatozoide que fertilize o óvulo pode-se gerar um indivíduo XX (fêmea) ou um XY (macho). Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- O cromossomo “Y” é uma “invenção” relativamente recente na história da evolução das espécies e do estudo da genética. Surgiu a partir de uma mutação de um cromossomo “X”, que resultou na perda de um de seus braços, que é por onde se originou a morfologia do cromossomo Y. A maioria dos genes presentes no cromossomo Y também existem no cromossomo X; assim mesmo somente alguns genes do cromossomo Y foram evoluídos até ser diferentes dos genes do cromossomo X. Embora os machos possuam um cromossomo que não está presente nas fêmeas, esse mesmo cromossomo não aporta toda a informação genética original. Todos os genes existentes nas fêmeas estão também presentes nos dos machos, já que eles também possuem um cromossomo X. Uma particularidade do cromossomo Y, ao existir somente uma cópia nos machos, é que ele sofre um entrecruzamento com um cromossomo análogo durante o processo de meiose, pelo que o cromossomo Y de um macho é idêntico ao de seu progenitor e ao de seus descendentes, exceto no caso em que ocorra uma mutação espontânea. Em contraste, os cromossomos X das fêmeas (um proveniente do pai e outro da mãe) se entrecruzam durante a meiose, por onde cada óvulo produzido pela fêmea terá uma combinação de alelos distinta em seu cromossomo X. Ao estudar as diferenças presentes na sequência de DNA do cromossomo Y, é possível identificar a distância filogenética entre os indivíduos (quanto mais diferenças existirem entre os cromossomos significa que seu ancestral comum está mais longe). Algo análogo ocorre com o DNA das mitocôndrias, que sempre são aportados pela mãe e nunca sofrem recombinação genética. Gene SRY -/- Um dos poucos genes do cromossomo Y que não possuem correspondência com o cromossomo X é o gene SRY (Sex-determining Region of the Y chromossome – região do cromossomo Y determinante do sexo). Esse gene se expressa somente na gônada em formação nos embriões machos, em particular em células precursoras das células de Sertoli; ele codifica uma proteína da família SOX (SRY-like Box) que é uma família formada por proteínas que possuem um domínio de união ao DNA e que atuam como fatores de transcrição. Ao produzir-se a proteína SRY nas células precursoras das células de Sertoli estimula-se a expressão (transcrição) de outro gene análogo, denominado SOX-9 que, por sua vez, atua como um fator de transcrição que ativa a expressão de outros genes, como o FGF-9 (Fibroblast Growth Factor-9), ou seja ele é o estimulante de ativação dos demais. Os produtos dos genes SOX-9 e FGF-9 iniciam uma cascata de expressões que provocam a diferenciação das células de suporte da gônada indiferenciada (crista genital) em células de Sertoli. Em seguida, essas células dirigem a diferenciação das células intersticiais da crista genital em células de Leydig, o que finalmente resulta na formação de um testículo. Outro dos efeitos da proteína codificada por SOX-9 é um estímulo maior da expressão de seu próprio gene, pelo qual é produzido um ciclo de retroalimentação positiva que favorece a continuidade do processo de formação testicular. Como nos embriões da fêmea não existe o gene SRY, a gônada indiferenciada não é estimulada para expressar os genes SOX-9 nem o FGF-9 nas células de suporte (que nesse caso serão precursoras de células da granulosa). A gônada, em mudança, expressa em forma constitutiva, isto é, sem a necessidade de estimulação, outra cascata de genes que incluem o WNT4 (Wingless-integration Factor 4) e o RAPO1 (Respondina-1), que por sua vez iniciam uma cascata de expressão gênica, a qual provoca a diferenciação das células somáticas da gônada indiferenciada para formação das células da granulosa e células da teca, esse feito conduz, por sua vez, a formação de um ovário. No embrião macho a proteína SOX-9 inibe a expressão dos genes WNT4 e RSPO-1, pelo que a presença do gene SRY, e portanto de SOX-9, inibem a formação de um ovário ao mesmo tempo que estimulam a formação do testículo (figura 3). Em suma, se o embrião possui genótipo XY (um embrião macho), o gene SRY começa a expressar-se sobre as células precursoras da gônada imediatamente depois da formação da mesma, quando os cordões sexuais primários estão se desenvolvendo na medula. A expressão do gene, assim como a presença subsequente das proteínas SOX-9 e FGF-9 estimula a distinção das células de Sertoli e que se organizem os tubos seminíferos a partir dos cordões sexuais primários. Em contrapartida, em um embrião com genótipo XX (fêmea) não existe o gene SRY, pelo qual é impossível que se elevem os níveis das proteínas SOX-9 e FGF-9 e as células precursoras não se diferenciam em células de Sertoli, e portanto os cordões sexuais primários sofrem regressão. Depois de alguns dias, começam a organizar-se os cordões sexuais secundários e as células precursoras iniciam a expressão do gene WNT4, o que leva as mesmas a diferenciar-se em células da granulosa, que serão a base para a conformação dos folículos ovarianos. Se em um embrião XY, macho, a expressão do gene SRY demora, é formada um ovo-testículo devido a que algumas das células somáticas das cristas gonodais começam a expressar o gene WNT4, e a diferenciar-se em células da granulosa, enquanto que em outras a proteína SRY chega a tempo para dirigir a diferenciação para formação das células de Sertoli. No ovário em formação é expressado um gene denominado DAX-1 (Dosage-sensitive Sex Reversal). Esse gene, localizado no cromossomo X, codifica uma proteína que é um membro da família dos receptores nucleares ao que lhe falta o domínio de união ao DNA, pelo que parece atuar no bloqueio de diversos fatores de transcrição, entre os que se encontra o SRY. Como a proteína DAX-1 impede a ação da proteína SRY, um excesso de expressão do gene DAX-1 pode provocar a feminilização gonodal de indivíduos XY, macho, embora tenham SRY. Em condições normais, a expressão adequada do gene DAX-1 não é capaz de evitar a masculinização gonodal de embriões com o gene SRY, daqui o nome de reversão sexual dependente da dose. Figura 3: série de expressão gênica para a determinação gonodal. SRY (Região do cromossomo Y determinante do sexo), SOX-9 (SRY-like Box-9), FGF-9 (Fator de crescimento de fibroblastos-9), WNT4 (Wingless-integration Factor-4), RSPO-1 (Respondina-1). Uma vez que o SRY induz a expressão de SOX-9 na gônada masculina, inicia-se um processo de feedback positivo mediante o qual os níveis de expressão de SOX-9 e FGF-9 vão aumentando, ao mesmo tempo que inibem a expressão de WNT-4 e RSPO-1. Na gônada feminina não se expressam SRY, SOX-9 e nem FGF-9, o que permite que se expressem os genes WNT-4 e RSPO-1, que iniciam uma cascata de sinalização que dirige a formação de um ovário. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- • ___DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL DOS GENITAIS -/- Uma vez que se formam os testículos, todo o desenvolvimento subsequente dos órgãos e as características “masculinas” em lugar das femininas é em consequência dos hormônios produzidos pelos testículos em formação, incluindo os andrógenos e o hormônio inibidor dos ductos de Müller. Mediante a ausência de testículos todo o desenvolvimento dos órgãos genitais internos e externos segue um padrão feminino, sem levar em conta se estão presentes os ovários; o que significa a ausência de hormônios gonodais determina que o embrião se desenvolva como fêmea, uma vez que não requerem hormônios ovarianos para desencadear o padrão feminino. Por sua vez, as gônadas masculinas (os testículos), produzem substâncias que desviam o desenvolvimento em direção ao padrão masculino. Sob etapas relativamente rápidas da diferenciação todos os embriões possuem dois pares de dutos sexuais, os dutos de Wolff ou mesonéfricos e os dutos de Müller ou paramesonéfricos (figura 4). A testosterona secretada pelos testículos do feto macho em desenvolvimento atua sobre os dutos de Wolff, o que induz a formação posterior dos dutos deferentes, do epidídimo e das glândulas seminais (figura 4). Figura 4: formação dos órgãos genitais internos a partir dos dutos de Wolff no macho e dos dutos de Müller na fêmea. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- Os testículos produzem ao mesmo tempo, uma glicoproteína chamada Hormônio Inibidor dos Dutos de Müller (Müllerian Inhibiting Hormone, MIH, também chamado de Anti-Müllerian Hormone, AMH); como o seu nome indica, inibe o desenvolvimento dos dutos de Müller ou paramesonéfricos, provocando sua regressão, que impede a formação dos órgãos genitais característicos da fêmea como os ovidutos, o útero, a cérvix e a porção cranial da vagina (figura 4). O MIH é uma glicoproteína da família dos fatores de crescimento transformativo β (TGFβ). O gene MIH possui locais de união para os produtos dos genes SOX-9 e SF-1, pelo que a presença simultânea de ambos fatores de transcrição é necessária para a secreção do MIH e leva a cabo sua função de iniciação dos dutos de Müller sobre o embrião macho (vale lembrar que nessa etapa tanto a gônada de embriões machos como de embriões fêmeas expressam o gene SF-1, mas somente o macho expressa o SOX-9, para que unicamente esse último produza MIH). O certo é que na gônada do embrião fêmea não se produzem quantidades importantes da proteína SOX-9, além de que se produz a proteína DAX-1, mesma que antagoniza tanto a SOX-9 como a SF-1, todo o qual impede a produção de MIH e resulta no desenvolvimento dos dutos de Müller até a formação dos ovidutos, útero, cérvix e a porção cranial da vagina (figura 4). Assim, na fêmea, ao não haver testículos não circulam concentrações elevadas de andrógenos, o que impedirá o desenvolvimento dos dutos de Wolff, enquanto que os dutos de Müller se desenvolvem já que não haverá a presença do MIH para impedi-lo. O desenvolvimento dos genitais internos e externos femininos não requerem a presença de nenhum hormônio ovariano o que levará a cabo de maneira predeterminada (ou pré-estabelecida) na ausência de testículos. Outra estrutura interna que também se desenvolve de forma distinta nos machos e nas fêmeas é o seio urogenital, que no embrião macho é estimulado pela testosterona para formação da próstata, das glândulas bulbouretrais e da uretra peniana, enquanto que na fêmea forma a porção caudal da vagina. A respeito dos órgãos genitais externos (figura 5), nos embriões de ambos os sexos existem estruturas precursoras chamadas de tubérculo genital e pregas vestibulares. Na fêmea o tubérculo genital da origem ao clitóris e as pregas vestibulares dão origem aos lábios vulvares sem a necessidade da atuação de hormônios ovarianos, já que o padrão “por via pré-estabelecida” é feminino. Em contrapartida, no macho, tanto o tubérculo genital quanto as pregas vestibulares respondem ao hormônio 5α-dehidro-testosterona (DHT), ao qual se formam as células da pele da zona genital a partir da testosterona que é secretada pelos testículos. Para isso existem nas células a enzima 5α-reductasa, que transforma a testosterona em DHT. Uma vez formada, a DHT atua sobre as pregas vestibulares do embrião macho para que se fusionem e formem o escroto (em lugar dos lábios vulvares), e sobre o tubérculo genital para formar o pênis (em lugar do clitóris). Figura 5: estruturas que se desenvolvem nos embriões de cada sexo a partir do seio urogenital, o tubérculo genital e as pregas vestibulares. A cor do né de cada estrutura final corresponde com a cor do nome da estrutura a partir da qual se originou. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- • ___DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL DO SISTEMA NERVOSO -/- Existem inúmeras diferenças funcionais entre o sistema nervoso da fêmeas e o do machos, em humanos podem incluir diferenças tão complexas como a maior capacidade de verbal da mulher ou a maior capacidade de orientação espacial do homem. Nessa parte será abordada aquelas diferenças que influenciam diretamente sobre a função reprodutiva, como as diferenças na regulação da secreção de gonadotropinas ou as diferenças na capacidade de comportamento sexual masculino ou feminino. É necessário lembrar que, apesar de que essas diferenças se originem durante um período crítico da vida fetal ou neonatal (dependendo da espécie), geralmente se fazem presentes até que o animal chegue a vida adulta e demonstre obter ou não a capacidade para se comportar como macho ou como fêmea uma vez que é exposto aos hormônios sexuais que são secretada depois da puberdade. Igualmente aos processos acima citados, podemos afirmar que nos mamíferos o padrão pré-estabelecido de comportamento sexual e de secreção de gonadotropinas é o feminino. Se durante os primeiros dias de vida neonatal uma rata fêmea não é exposta a nenhum hormônio gonodal, ao chegar a vida adulta ela terá a capacidade de se comportar como fêmea na presença de estrógenos, assim como de secretar um pico pré-ovulatório de GnRH/LH em resposta aos mesmos (figura 6). Essa rata, portanto, não poderá se comportar como macho embora que em sua vida adulta seja exposta a testosterona. O sistema nervoso do rato macho recém-nascido que é exposto aos andrógenos produzidos pelos testículos, em detrimento, faz com que adquiram o potencial para se comportar como machos em sua vida adulta e que perdem o potencial para ter conduta de fêmeas na presença e/ou administração de estrógenos (processo conhecido como desfeminização do SNC). Se por meios de experimentos injetamos testosterona em uma rata fêmea recém-nascida, essa rata não poderá se comportar como fêmea em sua vida adulta, e passará a se comportar como macho. A castração neonatal de um rato (visando evitar a exposição de seu SNC a andrógenos testiculares), assim mesmo, resultará em sua vida adulta um padrão feminino (SNC feminizado e não masculinizado). O hipotálamo das ratas adultas possui uma área em que o número, características e densidade dos corpos neurais difere em machos e fêmeas, essa área é denominada como “núcleo sexualmente dimórfico do hipotálamo”, e tem demonstrado que quando as ratas são tratadas com testosterona na vida neonatal, a morfologia de seu núcleo sexualmente dimórfico será masculinizado em sua vida adulta, enquanto que a castração neonatal de ratos resulta em um núcleo sexualmente dimórfico feminizado em sua vida adulta. Isso significa que a exposição ou não a testosterona na vida neonatal é o que determina que tipo de núcleo sexualmente dimórfico se desenvolverá, o que por sua vez está relacionado com o tipo de conduta que o animal poderá expressar em sua vida adulta. Não deixa de ser um paradoxo que ao injetar uma dose elevada de estrógenos nos primeiros dias de vida de uma rata, os núcleos sexualmente dimórficos da mesma se desenvolverão como macho e em sua vida adulta seu potencial de conduta estará masculinizado e desfeminizado. O hormônio “feminino” conhecido como estradiol, masculiniza o hipotálamo e a conduta do animal. Logo, se a rata neonatal for exposta a injeção de andrógeno não-aromatizado (que não pode ser transformado em estrógenos pelas células) ela não se masculiniza. A masculinização e desfeminização dos ratos ou das ratas tratados com testosterona, na realidade, não são provocados pela própria testosterona, senão pelos estrógenos que se formam dentro dos neurônios quando absorvem a testosterona do sangue e a aromatizam para transformá-la em estrógenos (figura 6). Figura 6: desfeminização e masculinização do sistema nervoso central por meio da testosterona, que quando não absorvida pela α-fetoproteína pode entrar nos neurônios, onde se aromatizam para serem transformados em estrógenos, hormônio que é responsável pela desfeminização. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. Por que as ratas, que possuem ovários funcionalmente produtores de estrógenos, não se masculinizam? A resposta está em uma proteína denominada α-fetoproteína que circula em altas concentrações nos fetos e nos recém-nascidos. Essa proteína possui a capacidade de unir-se aos estrógenos, ao qual impede seu entrada nas células. Os ratos, em desenvolvimento, produzem testosterona, no entanto não possui afinidade pela α-fetoproteína, o que permite com que ela circule livremente. Ao chegar ao SNC, a testosterona (que não foi absorvida) pode entrar nos neurônios e dentro deles se aromatizam e transformam-se em estrógenos, que finalmente masculinizam o SNC. A diferenciação sexual do hipotálamo depende, em síntese, da presença ou ausência dos testículos, o que permite que se produza ou não o hormônio testosterona que pode não ser absorvida por parte da α-fetoproteína, transformar-se em estrógenos e masculinizar o SNC. -/- •___CONCLUSÃO -/- Nos mamíferos todo o processo que se requerem para o desenvolvimento de um macho depende da existência de somente um gene do cromossomo Y, o gene SRY; a ausência desse gene resulta no desenvolvimento de uma fêmea. A presença ou ausência do gene SRY determina, então, a cadeia de eventos morfogênicos que ocorrerá em sua expressão ou não, para desenvolver todos os órgãos e características de um macho ou de uma fêmea. Por essa razão, os indivíduos com uma monossomia XOA (síndrome de Turner) são fêmeas (por não possuir o cromossomo Y nem o gene SRY), enquanto que os indivíduos triploides XXY (síndrome de Kleinefelter) são machos embora possuam dois cromossomos X. Em algumas espécies, no entanto, têm-se identificado machos que são cromossomicamente XX; nesses casos é determinado invariavelmente que por ser um erro durante a meiose a região do cromossomo Y em que reside o gene SRY tem sido transloucada ao cromossomo X. Da mesma forma, em alguns casos tem sido encontrado fêmeas com cariótipo XY; que nelas se identifica uma mutação inabilitante do gene SRY. Isso demonstra experimentalmente que por meio da engenharia genética é possível produzir machos com cariótipo XY mas com o gene SRY eliminado (knockout). Como é de se esperar, esses machos desenvolvem ovários e todos seus órgãos genitais, tanto internos quanto externos, e se desenvolvem como fêmeas. Os machos cromossomicamente XX transgênicos aos que se insertam uma cópia do gene SRY, desenvolvem testículos e um fenótipo masculino, embora sejam estéreis por causa da ausência de alguns genes do cromossomo Y que são necessários para a realização de uma espermatogênese normal. As falhas nos mecanismos de diferenciação sexual podem, diretamente, ocasionar anormalidades como as observadas nas bezerras Freemartin, que são bezerras originadas de uma gestação gemelar em que seu gêmeo era macho. O que sucede é que na espécie bovina, quando há uma gestação gemelar, é produzido um certo grau de anastomose entre as placentas dos fetos, o que permite a troca de sangue e de células entre ambos. Os produtos recebem, então, algumas células de seu gêmeos, que encontram seu lugar no órgão correspondente e se integram a ele. No caso particular das gônadas, quando o ovário primitivo de um embrião fêmea é colonizado por algumas células gonodais de seu gêmeo macho, essas células expressam o gene SRY, o que fará com que essa região da gônada se diferencie como testículo. Como resultado, se desenvolve um ovo-testículo (com maior ou menor proporção de tecido testicular dependendo do grau de colonização da gônada em formação por células provenientes do gêmeo macho). Ademais, ao haver certa quantidade de tecido testicular produtor de MIH, circularão sobre o feto fêmea níveis desse hormônio que, embora baixos, afetarão o desenvolvimento normal dos dutos de Müller, fazendo com que as bezerras Freemartin possuam genitálias internas ausentes ou pouco desenvolvidas. Os andrógenos produzidos pelas zonas de tecido testicular, por fim, são suficientes para causar um certo grau de masculinização, que se manifesta como um clitóris mais grande que o normal ou um desenvolvimento corporal masculinizado. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- ARNOLD, Arthur P.; CHEN, Xuqi; ITOH, Yuichiro. What a difference an X or Y makes: sex chromosomes, gene dose, and epigenetics in sexual differentiation. In: Sex and gender differences in pharmacology. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013. p. 67-88. CUNNINGHAM, James. Tratado de fisiologia veterinária. Elsevier Health Sciences, 2011. DERIVAUX, Jules; BARNABÉ, Renato Campanarut. Reprodução dos animais domésticos. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1980. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Desenvolvimento Embrionário e Diferenciação Sexual nos Animais Domésticos. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Julho de 2020. HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, Bahaa. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HIDALGO, C. Galina et al. Reproducción de animales domésticos. México: Limusa, 2008. MACLAUGHLIN, David T.; DONAHOE, Patricia K. Sex determination and differentiation. New England Journal of Medicine, v. 350, n. 4, p. 367-378, 2004. MCCARTHY, Margaret M.; ARNOLD, Arthur P. Reframing sexual differentiation of the brain. Nature neuroscience, v. 14, n. 6, p. 677, 2011. PLANT, Tony M.; ZELEZNIK, Anthony J. (Ed.). Knobil and Neill's physiology of reproduction. Academic Press, 2014. REY, Rodolfo. Diferenciación sexual embrio-fetal: De las moléculas a la anatomía. Revista chilena de anatomía, v. 19, n. 1, p. 75-82, 2001. SENGER, P. L. Embryogenesis of the pituitary gland and male or female reproductive system. In. Pathways to Pregnancy and Parturition. Current Conception Inc, v. 1, p. 8-76, 1997. ZARCO, L. Diferenciación sexual. In. PORTA, L. R.; MEDRANO, J. H. H. Fisiología reproductiva de los animales domésticos. Cidade do México: FMVZ-UNAM, 2018. -/- REALIZAÇÃO -/- . (shrink)

About death, grief, mourning, life after death and immortality. Why should we die like humans to survive as a species. -/- "No one wants to die. Even people who want to go to heaven don't want to die to get there. And yet death is the destination we all share. No one has ever escaped it. And that is as it should be, because Death is very likely the single best invention of Life. It is Life's change agent. It clears (...) out the old to make way for the new." (Steve Jobs) -/- CONTENTS: -/- Death - Philosophy of death - Religions - - Animism - - Atheism - - Buddhism - - Christianity - - Hinduism - - Islam - - Jainism - - Jehovah's Witnesses - - Judaism - - Latter-day Saints - - Spiritism - Symbolism - Personification of Death - - Notable personifications - - In mythologies - - - Hindu mythology - - - In Japan - - - Slavic paganism - - - Lithuanian paganism - - In the three monotheistic religions - - - Judaism - - - Christianity - - - In Mexico - - - Islam - Axiochos - - The characters of dialogue - - Dialogue - - Prologue - - Arguments - - Citations - Paradise - - Greco-Roman mythology - - Mesopotamian mythology and influences - - According to Judaism - - According to Christianity - - - According to Catholicism - - - According to Protestantism - - - According to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints - - According to Islam - - According to Hinduism - - According to modern spiritualities - - - According to the esoteric - Hell - - Mesopotamian origins - - According to Christianity - - - Names appearing in the biblical texts - - - Medieval artistic representations - - - Concepts according to Christian movements - - According to Judaism - - According to Islam - - According to Buddhism - - According to Hinduism - - According to modern esotericism - - - According to Aïvanhov - - - According to Allan Kardec - - Philosophy - - - Jewish Kabbalah - - - Sartre - - - Popular wisdom Funerals - The funeral ritual: a rite of passage - Prehistory - Ancient death customs - - The family bereavement - - Mummification - - Sarcophagi - - Funerals - - Ancient Greece - - Ancient Rome - - Celts, Germans and Scandinavians - Religious funeral rites - - Buddhism - - Judaism - Christianity - - Protestantism - - Islam - Funeral rites by continent - - In Africa - - In Europe - The contemporary era - Mourning (Grief) - - Steps - - - Death of a close - - Loss events without mourning value (white factors) - - Duration and manifestations - - Risks - - Colors - Graveyards (Cemeteries) - - First cemeteries - - Cemeteries today - Funerary art - Dolmens - - Types of dolmens - - Function - - Location - Passage graves - Cenotaphs - - Famous cenotaphs - Lanterns of the Dead Afterlife - History - Questions about death and immortality - Testimonials - - Spiritualistic experiences - - Popular literature on the afterlife - - "Memories" and reminiscences - - Early studies of the science of the 19th century and early 20th century - Types of scenarios - Some religious and philosophical concepts - - Afterlife in Buddhism - - Afterlife in Christianity - - According to Hinduism - - According to Islam - - According to Judaism - - According to Mormonism - - According to the ancient philosophies - - According to Spiritism - - According to Native American traditions - - According to Vedism - - According to Esotericism - In science - Near-death experiences - - Clinical death - - NDE frequency - - Effects of depth of NDE on survival - - Near-death experiences and shared-death experience - - - The first contemporary testimonials - - - Experience according to Moody - - - The concept of "shared death" - - - The NDE scales - - The study of Pim van Lommel - - Spiritual and patient point of view - - - Survivalists studies - - - The religious understanding of the phenomenon - - Scientific views - - - Physiological explanation - - - Psychological explanation - Reincarnation - - Religions - - - In Hinduism - - - In Jainism - - - In Buddhism - - - In Judaism - - - In Christianity - - - In Islam - - In contemporary times - - - Esotericism - - - Works of the psychiatrist Ian Stevenson - - - Radical increase in life expectancy and artificial reincarnation - - Criticism - - - Arthur Schopenhauer - - - Ramana Maharshi - - - Rene Guenon - - - Ananda Kentish Coomaraswamy - Metempsychosis - - Theories - - Ideas - Maschalismos Immortality - Immortality of the soul and religious traditions - - Buddhism - - Christianity - - Islam - - Mormonism - Contemporary perception of the immortality of the body - - Observation in the animal kingdom - - Perspectives for mankind - Immortality in science - - Alexis Carrel - - Jean Rostand - - Hayflick limit - - Étienne-Émile Baulieu and DHEA - - Aubrey de Grey - - Professor Skulachev - - Regenerative medicine - - Professor Christopher Jaeger - Eternal Return - - According to the Mesopotamians - - According to Heraclitus and the Stoics - Fountain of Youth - - History of myth and relatives myths - - - In Roman mythology, Germanic, Celtic and Irish - - - In the Middle-East - - - In Spain - - - In the Bible - - The fountain in art and literature - - Painting - - - Literature and cinema - - Persistent of the myth until today - Senescence - - Why do we age? - - Gene regulation - - Cellular senescence Undead - Ghoul - Lich - Mummy - Skeleton - Vampire - Zombie - Other legendary creatures - Creatures specific to a particular universe - Spiritism - - Point out - - Origins of spiritism - - - The traditions through the ages - - - Advent of Christianity in Europe - - - The survival of necromancy - - - The precursors - - - Relations of spiritualism to science - Mediumship - - History - - Skeptical point of view - - Favorable doctor's viewpoint - Ghosts - - Appearance - - Belief in ghosts - - Origin - - - Duality and return dead - - - Ancient roots - - Typology - - - Poltergeists - - - Revenants - - - Ghosts - - - Banshees - - - Apparitions of crisis - - - Phantasms of the living - - - Vision of his own double - - - Ghost armies - - - Ghosts of animals - - - Means of transport - - Science perspective - - - Hallucinations - - - Sleep paralysis - - - Induced ghosts - - - Aches and infrasounds - - - Magnetic fields - Vampires - - Characteristics - - - Vampire transformation - - - Identification - - - Faculties - - Protection against the vampires - - - Precautions at death and burial - - - Apotropaic objects and places - - Destruction of vampires - Zombie - - The concept - - Africa and voodoo - - - West Africa - - - South Africa - - - In Haiti (and the Caribbean) - - - Scientific research - - The "revenants" in the Western imaginary Death in art - Memento mori - - History - - - Antiquity - - - Christianity - - - Mexican syncretism - - Performing arts - - - In painting - - - In literature - - - In movies - - - In video games - - - In Japanese animation - - - In music - The iconography of Weighing of souls (Particular judgment) - - Origin - - Written sources - - Weighing in Romanesque art - - Weighing in Gothic art - - Weighing in the late Middle Ages: to a new iconography - - Weighing of souls or actions? - Poems - - Charlotte Brontë, “On the Death of Anne Brontë” - - Edgar Allan Poe, “Annabel Lee” - - Edna St. Vincent Millay, “And you as well must die” - - Emily Dickinson, “Because I could not stop for Death” - - Emily Dickinson, “If I Should Die” - - Lord Byron, “Epitaph to a Dog” - - Pablo Neruda, “Only Death” - - Stephen Crane, “God Lay Dead in Heaven” - - W. B. Yeats, “He Wishes His Beloved Were Dead” - - Rainer Maria Rilke, “Death” - Paintings - - The Three Dead Kings - - The Death of Nelson - - Beata Beatrix - Sculptures - - The Kiss of Death - - Background - - Imagery - - Angel of Grief - - Fallen Astronaut - Quotes References About the author - Nicolae Sfetcu - - By the same author - - Contact Publishing House - MultiMedia Publishing -/- DOI: 10.58679/TW44411. (shrink)

I argue that No-Ought-From-Is (in the sense that I believe it) is a relatively trivial affair. Of course, when people try to derive substantive or non-vacuous moral conclusions from non-moral premises, they are making a mistake. But No-Non-Vacuous-Ought-From-Is is meta-ethically inert. It tells us nothing about the nature of the moral concepts. It neither refutes naturalism nor supports non-cognitivism. And this is not very surprising since it is merely an instance of an updated version of the conservativeness of logic (in (...) a logically valid inference you don’t get out what you haven’t put in): so long as the expressions F are non-logical, you cannot get non-vacuous F-conclusions from non-F premises. However, the triviality of No-Non-Vacuous-Ought-From-Is is important and its non-profundity profound. No-Ought-From-Is is widely supposed to tell us something significant about the nature of the moral concepts. If, in fact, it tells us nothing, this is a point well worth shouting from the housetops. This brings me to my dispute with Gerhard Schurz who has proved a related version of No-Ought-From-Is, No-Ought-Relevant-Ought-From-Is, a proof which relaxes my assumption that ‘ought’ should not be treated as a logical constant. But if ought is not a logical expression then it does not really matter much that No-Ought-From-Is would be salvageable even if it were. Furthermore, Schurz’s proof depends on special features of the moral concepts and this might afford the basis for an abductive argument to something like non-cognitivism. As an error theorist, and therefore a cognitivist, I object. Finally I take a dim view of deontic logic. Many of its leading principles are false, bordering on the nonsensical, and even the reasonably plausible ones are subject to devastating counter-examples. (shrink)

Background: Current practice frequently fails to provide care consistent with the preferences of decisionally-incapacitated patients. It also imposes significant emotional burden on their surrogates. Algorithmic-based patient preference predictors (PPPs) have been proposed as a possible way to address these two concerns. While previous research found that patients strongly support the use of PPPs, the views of surrogates are unknown. The present study thus assessed the views of experienced surrogates regarding the possible use of PPPs as a means to help make (...) treatment decisions for decisionally-incapacitated patients. -/- Methods: This qualitative study used semi-structured interviews to determine the views of experienced surrogates [n=26] who were identified from two academic medical centers and two community hospitals. The primary outcomes were respondents’ overall level of support for the idea of using PPPs and the themes related to their views on how a PPP should be used, if at all, in practice. -/- Results: Overall, 21 participants supported the idea of using PPPs. The remaining five indicated that they would not use a PPP because they made decisions based on the patient’s best interests, not based on substituted judgment. Major themes which emerged were that surrogates, not the patient’s preferences, should determine how treatment decisions are made, and concern that PPPs might be used to deny expensive care or be biased against minority groups. -/- Conclusions: Surrogates, like patients, strongly support the idea of using PPPs to help make treatment decisions for decisionally-incapacitated patients. These findings provide support for developing a PPP and assessing it in practice. At the same time, patients and surrogates disagree over whose preferences should determine how treatment decisions are made, including whether to use a PPP. These findings reveal a fundamental disagreement regarding the guiding principles for surrogate decision-making. Future research is needed to assess this disagreement and consider ways to address it. (shrink)

Heron Heart is a poem born out of reflecting on the nature of existence during long stretches of isolation, where the boundary of what is and is not a living being was challenged—the nonhuman more alive than the human. It evokes the absurdity of the banal out of the confusion and beauty of sensory experience, with hints of nostalgia for a mythological world that never existed but is ever-present.

A scholar of Hellenistic and Prussian history, Droysen developed a historical theory that at the time was unprecedented in range and depth, and which remains to the present day a valuable key for understanding history as both an idea and a professional practice. Arthur Alfaix Assis interprets Droysen’s theoretical project as an attempt to redefine the function of historiography within the context of a rising criticism of exemplar theories of history, and focuses on Droysen’s claim that the goal underlying (...) historical writing and reading should be the development of the subjective capacity to think historically. In addition, Assis examines the connections and disconnections between Droysen’s theory of historical thinking, his practice of historical thought, and his political activism. Ultimately, Assis not only shows how Droysen helped reinvent the relationship between historical knowledge and human agency, but also traces some of the contradictions and limitations inherent to that project. (shrink)

Susan Neiman pointed out to this reviewer the danger that Carl Jung studies pose to contemporary scholars. It is keeping in mind Neiman's cautionary advice that this review establishes Jung's contributions to Romanticism. "[Craig] Stephenson’s analysis of Aurélia has now superseded Arthur Lovejoy’s (1873–1962) and Mario Praz’s (1896–1982) contributions to the definitions of Romanticism.".

Hannah Arendt's rich and varied political thought is more influential today than ever before, due in part to the collapse of communism and the need for ideas that move beyond the old ideologies of the Cold War. As Dana Villa shows, however, Arendt's thought is often poorly understood, both because of its complexity and because her fame has made it easy for critics to write about what she is reputed to have said rather than what she actually wrote. Villa (...) sets out to change that here, explaining clearly, carefully, and forcefully Arendt's major contributions to our understanding of politics, modernity, and the nature of political evil in our century.Villa begins by focusing on some of the most controversial aspects of Arendt's political thought. He shows that Arendt's famous idea of the banality of evil--inspired by the trial of Adolf Eichmann--does not, as some have maintained, lessen the guilt of war criminals by suggesting that they are mere cogs in a bureaucratic machine. He examines what she meant when she wrote that terror was the essence of totalitarianism, explaining that she believed Nazi and Soviet terror served above all to reinforce the totalitarian idea that humans are expendable units, subordinate to the all-determining laws of Nature or History. Villa clarifies the personal and philosophical relationship between Arendt and Heidegger, showing how her work drew on his thought while providing a firm repudiation of Heidegger's political idiocy under the Nazis. Less controversially, but as importantly, Villa also engages with Arendt's ideas about the relationship between political thought and political action. He explores her views about the roles of theatricality, philosophical reflection, and public-spiritedness in political life. And he explores what relationship, if any, Arendt saw between totalitarianism and the "great tradition" of Western political thought. Throughout, Villa shows how Arendt's ideas illuminate contemporary debates about the nature of modernity and democracy and how they deepen our understanding of philosophers ranging from Socrates and Plato to Habermas and Leo Strauss.Direct, lucid, and powerfully argued, this is a much-needed analysis of the central ideas of one of the most influential political theorists of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Benardete paradoxes involve infinite collections of Grim Reapers, assassins, demons, deafening peals, or even sentences. These paradoxes have recently been used in arguments for finitist metaphysical theses such as temporal finitism, causal finitism, and discrete views of time. Here we develop a new finite Benardete-like paradox. We then use this paradox to defend a companions in guilt argument that challenges recent applications of patchwork principles on behalf of the aforementioned finitist arguments. Finally, we develop another problem for those applications by (...) examining the notion of exact duplication. (shrink)

We expound an alternative to the Copenhagen interpretation of the formalism of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. The basic difference is that the new interpretation is formulated in the language of epistemological realism. It involves a change in some basic physical concepts. The ψ function is no longer interpreted as a probability amplitude of the observed behaviour of elementary particles but as an objective physical field representing the particles themselves. The particles are thus extended objects whose extension varies in time according to (...) the variation of ψ. They are considered as fundamental regions of space with some kind of nonlocality. Special consideration is given to the Heisenberg relations, the Einstein-Podolsky- Rosen correlations, the reduction process, the problem of measurement, and the quantum-statistical distributions. (shrink)

When people are making certain medical decisions – especially potentially transformative ones – the specter of regret may color their choices. In this paper, I ask: can predicting that we will regret a decision in the future serve any justificatory role in our present decision-making? And if so, what role? While there are many pitfalls to such reasoning, I ultimately conclude that considering future retrospective emotions like regret in our decisionmaking can be both rational and authentic. Rather than indicating that (...) one is about to make a mistake or that there is some underlying value that one already cares about but is overlooking, the prediction that one will regret a decision in the future makes one confront how her present values and priorities may change as a result of her choice in ways she cannot presently anticipate. (shrink)

A deeply personal reckoning with family, mental illness, and suicide, Dana Trusso captures the meaning of Nietzsche's armor fati--to love one's fate--through her surreal imagery and longing to heal intergenerational wounds. Lines are drawn from Lars von Trier's Melancholia, Sonic Youth's Experimental Jet Set, Trash and No Star, and lines she read from her aunt's journals as a child. -/- The photo is a sculpture of an earth goddess by Jean-Philippe Richard located in the botanical gardens of Èze, France. (...) Nearby is Le Chemin de Nietzsche, a steep hike from the seaside to mountainous ruins that is said to have inspired Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (shrink)

Abstract: Each affective state has distinct motor-expressions, sensory perceptions, autonomic, and cognitive patterns. Panksepp (1998) proposed seven neural affective systems of which the SEEKING system, a generalized approach-seeking system, motivates organisms to pursue resources needed for survival. When an organism is presented with a novel stimulus, the dopamine (DA) in the nucleus accumbens septi (NAS) is released. The DA circuit outlines the generalized mesolimbic dopamine-centered SEEKING system and is especially responsive when there is an element of unpredictability in forthcoming rewards. (...) We propose that when the outcome of this interaction is unexpected or unanticipated then Panksepp’s “cognitive or expectancy reset” mechanism involving the cognitive dissonance would yield the subjective emotion of surprise. In order to appropriately react to the environment’s stimuli one needs fundamental processes that would enable one to distinguish between what is novel and what has been already experienced, as well as the different degrees of novelty. Novel events are those whose essential features of the representation (visceral and perceptual) are altered and being discrepant provoke more sustained attention. Novelty arises from salient and arousing events and the organism experiences surprise, as coming out of a habitual state. In this framework, we shall look at established theories of emotions and propose a different approach to their taxonomy. (shrink)

This essay explores a conception of responsibility at work in moral and criminal responsibility. Our conception draws on work in the compatibilist tradition that focuses on the choices of agents who are reasons-responsive and work in criminal jurisprudence that understands responsibility in terms of the choices of agents who have capacities for practical reason and whose situation affords them the fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. Our conception brings together the dimensions of normative competence and situational control, and we factor normative (...) competence into cognitive and volitional capacities, which we treat as equally important to normative competence and responsibility. Normative competence and situational control can and should be understood as expressing a common concern that blame and punishment presuppose that the agent had a fair opportunity to avoid wrongdoing. This fair opportunity is the umbrella concept in our understanding of responsibility, one that explains it distinctive architecture. (shrink)

We often find ourselves in situations where it is up to us to make decisions on behalf of others. How can we determine whether such decisions are morally justified, especially if those decisions may change who it is these others end up becoming? In this paper, I will evaluate one plausible kind of justification that may tempt us: we may want to justify our decision by appealing to the likelihood that the other person will be glad we made that specific (...) choice down the line. Although it is tempting, I ultimately argue that we should reject this sort of appeal as a plausible justification for the moral permissibility of our vicarious decisions. This is because the decisions that we make on behalf of another may affect the interests and values that that person will hold in the future. As I will show, this complicates the justificatory relationship between present decisions and future attitudes, since the latter can depend on the former. This is not to say that the predicted future attitudes of others can play no significant role in justifying our decisions on others’ behalf. Rather, appealing to the future attitudes in our moral justifications may play an important role in our practical thinking but only when we consider the future attitudes of all relevant possible futures. (shrink)

In this paper, I endorse the idea that age is a defensible criterion for eligibility to vote, where age is itself a proxy for having a broad set of cognitive and motivational capacities. Given the current (and defeasible) state of developmental research, I suggest that the age of 16 is a good proxy for such capacities. In defending this thesis, I consider alternative and narrower capacity conditions while drawing on insights from a parallel debate about capacities and age requirements in (...) the criminal law. I also argue that the expansive capacity condition I adopt satisfies a number of powerful and complementary rationales for voting eligibility, and conclude by addressing challenging arguments that, on the one hand, capacity should not underlie voting eligibility in the first place, and, on the other, that capacity should do so directly and not via any sort of proxy, including age. (shrink)

In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir diagnoses “woman” as the “lost sex,” torn between her individual autonomy and her “feminine destiny.” Becoming a “real woman” in patriarchal societies demands that women lose their authentic, autonomous selves to become the “inessential Other” for Man. To better understand this diagnosis and how women might refind themselves, I rehabilitate the influence of Søren Kierkegaard and his concept of repetition as what must be lost to be found again in Beauvoir’s account of freedom (...) and, specifically, the liberation of women. Beauvoir offers a dual account of repetition, that of mundane repetition and sacrificial repetition, bringing them to bear both on her diagnosis of women’s oppression and her theorization of our liberation. Sacrificial repetition becomes a temporality for freedom—one must be able to repeat or retake their autonomy continuously toward an open future. For this to happen concretely, Beauvoir insists that we must sacrifice the (racist, classist) patriarchal ideals of the “real woman” and “real man” as we retake our autonomy and reconfigure the meaning of sex difference anew. (shrink)

Abstract: This research paper presents a novel approach to predict audit risks using a neural network model. The dataset used for this study was obtained from Kaggle and comprises 774 samples with 18 features, including Sector_score, PARA_A, SCORE_A, PARA_B, SCORE_B, TOTAL, numbers, marks, Money_Value, District, Loss, Loss_SCORE, History, History_score, score, and Risk. The proposed neural network architecture consists of three layers, including one input layer, one hidden layer, and one output layer. The neural network model was trained and validated, achieving (...) an impressive accuracy of 100% and an average error of 0.000015, indicating its robust predictive capability. Moreover, we conducted feature importance analysis to identify the most influential features for predicting audit risk. The key features found to be critical for classifying fraudulent activities in audit risk prediction are Sector_score, PARA_A, SCORE_A, PARA_B, SCORE_B, TOTAL, numbers, marks, Money_Value, District, Loss, Loss_SCORE, History, and History_score. This research contributes to the field of audit risk prediction by demonstrating the effectiveness of a neural network-based approach and highlighting the importance of specific features in detecting fraudulent activities. The findings have significant implications for auditors and organizations seeking to enhance their audit risk assessment processes, ultimately leading to improved financial transparency and fraud detection. (shrink)

Democratizing the syllabus has been discussed in the fields of sociology and political science but rarely in philosophy. In this paper I will draw upon my experience of teaching Philosophy of Love in an online modality to examine the impact on motivation when students fill in the gaps presented in a democratic syllabus.

Many people view disabilities as misfortunes, call this the standard view. In this paper, I examine one criticism that has been launched against the Standard View. Rather than determine in advance whether having a disability is good or bad for a person, some critics argue that the Standard View is reflective of and brings about inappropriate emotional responses toward people with disabilities and their circumstances. For instance, philosophers have recently argued that in holding the standard view, we become prone to (...) a destructive kind of unwarranted pity or that the view leads us to hold certain untenable or inappropriate hopes for our children and for our society. I think this sort of challenge to the Standard View has a lot of appeal, but I worry that if it is not properly articulated, the approach is vulnerable to what has been known as “The Wrong Kind of Reason” problem. The paper highlights and addresses this worry. (shrink)

There is no paradox with Schrödinger’s cat in a realist interpretation. In particular, a closer look at the temporal aspect shows that the two macroscopic wave functions (alive and dead) of Schrödinger’s cat are not to be compared with two superposed parts of a microscopic quantum wave function.

Dilation occurs when an interval probability estimate of some event E is properly included in the interval probability estimate of E conditional on every event F of some partition, which means that one’s initial estimate of E becomes less precise no matter how an experiment turns out. Critics maintain that dilation is a pathological feature of imprecise probability models, while others have thought the problem is with Bayesian updating. However, two points are often overlooked: (1) knowing that E is stochastically (...) independent of F (for all F in a partition of the underlying state space) is sufficient to avoid dilation, but (2) stochastic independence is not the only independence concept at play within imprecise probability models. In this paper we give a simple characterization of dilation formulated in terms of deviation from stochastic independence, propose a measure of dilation, and distinguish between proper and improper dilation. Through this we revisit the most sensational examples of dilation, which play up independence between dilator and dilatee, and find the sensationalism undermined by either fallacious reasoning with imprecise probabilities or improperly constructed imprecise probability models. (shrink)

I am grateful to Donald Ainslie, Lisa Austin, Michael Blake, Abraham Drassinower, David Dyzenhaus, George Fletcher, Robert Gibbs, Louis-Philippe Hodgson, Sari Kisilevsky, Dennis Klimchuk, Christopher Morris, Scott Shapiro, Horacio Spector, Sergio Tenenbaum, Malcolm Thorburn, Ernest Weinrib, Karen Weisman, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for comments, and audiences in the UCLA Philosophy Department and Columbia Law School for their questions.

Recently, bioethicists and the UNCRPD have advocated for supported medical decision-making on behalf of patients with intellectual disabilities. But what does supported decision-making really entail? One compelling framework is Anita Silvers and Leslie Francis’ mental prosthesis account, which envisions supported decision-making as a process in which trustees act as mere appendages for the patient’s will; the trustee provides the cognitive tools the patient requires to realize her conception of her own good. We argue that supported decision-making would be better understood (...) as a collaborative process, giving patients with intellectual disabilities the opportunity to make decisions in a respectful relationship with trusted others. We offer an alternative account of supported decision-making where the primary constraint is to protect the patient from domination by the trustee. This is advantageous in its preservation of the prospects for genuine collaboration, for the mental prosthesis approach ultimately reinforces a problematic ideal of isolated patient self-determination. (shrink)

Many have begun to despair that climate justice will prevail even in a minimal form. The affective dimensions of such despair, we suggest, threaten to make climate action appear too demanding. Thus, despair constitutes a moral challenge to individual climate action that has not yet received adequate attention. In response, we defend a duty to act in hope for a more just (climate) future. However, as we see it, this duty falls differentially upon the shoulders of more and less advantaged (...) agents in society. From arguments by Black thinkers like Derrick Bell, we draw a set of distinctions between two types of hope: one for ideal justice, and one for more modest change; and between two types of hopeful actions, those undertaken through formal political channels and those we call 'extra-political' actions; and between two sites of differential moral burdens, those of the privileged and those of the oppressed. Ours is a case for facing even bleak realities, demanding otherwise, and acting in hope to achieve a better future. (shrink)

The aesthetics of body and dress are in a continuous flux. The body, being the locus where fashion challenges the traditional norms, escapes from the narrow boundaries of the conventionally beautiful; the disgusting soma, in the realm of Negative Aesthetics, takes its place. In this paper, I attempt to define what is disgusting fashion and how can contribute to the deliberation of the body from the restricting margins of the aesthetically beautiful. The distorted imagery of the feminine soma is the (...) center of the analysis of the non-beautiful as an aesthetically pleasing phenomenon. Different examples of repulsive clothing are analyzed from a philosophical point of view, in order to understand the relation between the negative emotional responses towards disgusting fashion and its aesthetic value. -/- . (shrink)

Determinism is established in quantum mechanics by tracing the probabilities in the Born rules back to the absolute (overall) phase constants of the wave functions and recognizing these phase constants as pseudorandom numbers. The reduction process (collapse) is independent of measurement. It occurs when two wavepackets overlap in ordinary space and satisfy a certain criterion, which depends on the phase constants of both wavepackets. Reduction means contraction of the wavepackets to the place of overlap. The measurement apparatus fans out the (...) incoming wavepacket into spatially separated eigenpackets of the chosen observable. When one of these eigenpackets together with a wavepacket located in the apparatus satisfy the criterion, the reduction associates the place of contraction with an eigenvalue of the observable. The theory is nonlocal and contextual. Keywords:. (shrink)

The computational paradigm, which has dominated psychology and artificial intelligence since the cognitive revolution, has been a source of intense debate. Recently, several cognitive scientists have argued against this paradigm, not by objecting to computation, but rather by objecting to the notion of representation. Our analysis of these objections reveals that it is not the notion of representation per se that is causing the problem, but rather specific properties of representations as they are used in various psychological theories. Our analysis (...) suggests that all theorists accept the idea that cognitive processing involves internal information-carrying states that mediate cognitive processing. These mediating states are a superordinate category of representations. We discuss five properties that can be added to mediating states and examine their importance in various cognitive models. Finally, three methodological lessons are drawn from our analysis and discussion. (shrink)

Socrates engages his audience in Phaedrus with speeches that include revised or newly composed myths that express his theory of philosophical eros. The aim of the speeches is to generate a love for truth that spills over into dialogue. Speeches are a starting point for dialogue, just like physical attraction is the beginning of love. In the case of Phaedrus, the beginning of philosophy is portrayed using playful and rhetorically rich speeches that serve as "love potions" awakening the novice's soul, (...) and ultimately leading Phaedrus to higher rungs on the ladder of love through the palinode, a medicinal speech. It is thinking about speeches, not the speeches themselves, which moves Socrates' student Phaedrus from the love of speeches to the love of Beauty itself. This is a stark contrast to the purpose of speechmaking for the sophist. The sophist seeks to enchant the soul, while the philosopher seeks to charm the soul into loving wisdom through stimulating discussions. Socrates also uses role reversals in the lover-beloved relationship to model the soul's ascent, contrasting the traditional roles with the way the lover and beloved are presented in Socrates' speeches. The novice must actively recollect Beauty itself in order to ascend, rather than passively listening to speeches that provide an image of beauty. Socrates' interlocutors must move themselves up the ladder of love from their own philosophical eros; wisdom is not attained by merely being pushed all the way up the ladder of love. (shrink)

The present narrative review seeks to unravel where we are now, and where we need to go to delineate the active ingredients in psychotherapy delivered by conversational agents (e.g., chatbots). While psychotherapy delivered by conversational agents has shown promising effectiveness for depression, anxiety, and psychological distress across several randomized controlled trials, little emphasis has been placed on the therapeutic processes in these interventions. The theoretical framework of this narrative review is grounded in prominent perspectives on the active ingredients in psychotherapy. (...) Based on search terms derived from various theoretical perspectives, we conducted a systematic literature search of four scientific databases and identified 17 studies. Across the selected studies, three themes emerged: relationship variables, emotional venting, and cognitive factors. While methodological issues compromise the epistemic value of this evidence base, core questions also remain to be answered. Such questions include, but are not limited to, whether humans can form affectionate bonds to inanimate beings and whether these kind of mental health treatments should be understood as psychotherapy or something else. Researchers should therefore be cautious when applying theories of psychotherapy in the realm of conversational agents. We conclude the paper by introducing recommendations for future research, which we hope will help instigate methodologically sound studies in this field. (shrink)

In this paper, I first present an overview of Asay’s _A Theory of Truthmaking_, highlighting what I take to be some of its most attractive features, especially his re-invigoration of the ontological understanding of truthmaking and his defence of ontology-first truthmaking over explanation-first truthmaking. Then, I articulate what I take to be a puzzling potential inconsistency: (a) he appeals to considerations to do with aboutness in criticising how well ontological views account for truth while (b) ruling out aboutness from the (...) right account of truthmaking. He argues, instead, that necessitation is both necessary and sufficient for truthmaking (§3.3). I suggest that adding aboutness to one’s account in the right way is not just compatible with but important for ontology-first truthmaking. I do all this to invite Asay to clarify his position on these matters. Overall, Asay’s worldview displays the fruitfulness of an ontologically serious approach to metaphysics that puts truthmaking centre-stage. (shrink)

We present a game mechanic called pseudo-visibility for games inhabited by non-player characters (NPCs) driven by reinforcement learning (RL). NPCs are incentivized to pretend they cannot see pseudo-visible players: the training environment simulates an NPC to determine how the NPC would act if the pseudo-visible player were invisible, and penalizes the NPC for acting differently. NPCs are thereby trained to selectively ignore pseudo-visible players, except when they judge that the reaction penalty is an acceptable tradeoff (e.g., a guard might accept (...) the penalty in order to protect a treasure because losing the treasure would hurt even more). We describe an RL agent transformation which allows RL agents that would not otherwise do so to perform some limited self-reflection to learn the training environments in question. (shrink)

This paper considers the responsibilities of the FDA with regard to disseminating information about the benefits and harms of e-cigarettes. Tobacco harm reduction advocates claim that the FDA has been overcautious and has violated ethical obligations by failing to clearly communicate to the public that e-cigarettes are far less harmful than cigarettes. We argue, by contrast, that the FDA’s obligations in this arena are more complex than they may appear at first blush. Though the FDA is accountable for informing the (...) public about the health risks and benefits of products it regulates, it also has other roles that inform when and how it should disseminate information. In addition to being a knowledge purveyor, it is also a knowledge producer, an advisor to the public, and a practical agent shaping the material conditions in which people make health-related choices. In our view, those other roles call for caution in the way the FDA interprets and communicates the available evidence. (shrink)